














































NASA FMEA #: 0518-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LO2 TANK PRE-PRESS CHECK VALVE (CVI6)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COHPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA INFORMATION IS BASED ON NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING NOTES
(REF. J. BORCHES).
w





NASA FMEA #: 0518-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






L02 TANK PRE-PRESS CHECK VALVE (CVI6)
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]' [ F ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (if different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IF THIS CHECK VALVE FAILS TO CLOSE THE LO2 PRE-PRESS DISCONNECT
VALVE WOULD ADD REDUNDANCY. SINCE THE ACCELERATiONACTS STRONGLY
ON THE HEAVY LO2, LOSS OF LO2 AND LPOT PUMP CAVITATION ARE
UNLIKELY. HOWEVER, LOSS OF GO2 ULLAGE PRESSURE COULD CAUSE
THE LO2 TANK TO BUCKLE DUE TO ATMOSPHERIC FORCES ON AN
UNPRESSURIZED TANK. CONTAMINATION CAN CAUSE LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY. NASA INFORMATION IS BASED ON THE RI/NASA CRITICAL























NASA FMEA #: NA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LO2 TANK PRE-PRESS CHECK VALVE (CVI6)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] *
[X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS WORKSHEET SHOULD BE COMBINEDWITH MPS-1014. THE BURNING OF
THIS VALVE MIGHT CAUSE GO2 TO LEAK INTO THE AFT COMPARTMENT
POSSIBLY CAUSING OVERPRESSURIZATION. THE LOSS OF ULLAGE PRESSURE
MIGHT CAUSE THE LO2 TANK TO BUCKLE DUE TO ATMOSPHERIC














NASA FMEA #: N/A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






L02 TANK PRE-PRESS CHECK VALVE (CVI6)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] *
[x]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE )































NASA FMEA # : 0451-1
NASA DATA: ...........
BASELINE [ ]






L02 BLEED CHECK VALVE (CV31, 33, 35)
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA]
[ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IF THIS CHECK VALVE FAILS TO OPEN, LO2 WILL ACCUMULATE INSIDE THE
POGO ACCUMULATOR PUSHING THE GO2 OUT THROUGH THE PRESSURE
ISOLATION VALVE. THIS WOULD NEUTRALIZE THE POGO SUPPRESSION
SYSTEM CAUSING LOW-FREQUENCY VIBRATIONS TO BE ADDED TO THE
SHUTTLES
DYNAMICS IN THE FORM OF VARYING THRUST. THESE ADDITIONAL
DYNAMICS COULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF THE VEHICLE.
SINCE THE VALVE IS REALLY TWO CHECK VALVES IN PARALLEL, TWO
FAILURES ARE REQUIRED FOR THE DESCRIBED EFFECTS TO OCCUE. NASA
INFORMATION IS BASED ON THE RI/NASA CRITICAL ITEMS LIST OF 12-23-
87 AND THE 0451-1 CIL WORKSHEET OF 9-16-87. THIS WORKSHEET










NASA FMEA #: 0451-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LO2 BLEED CHECK VALVE (CV31, 33, 35)
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ F ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




_:GROUND CHECKOUT WILL NOT_ INDICA_TE THATBOTH DUAL REDUND_T_HECK
VALVES ARE OPERATING PROPERLY. NASA INFORMATION IS BASED ON THE
RI/NAS_CR_I-Ti_CA_ I_TE_ L I_S_T O_F 121-2 3-8-7_ AND THE _IL WOR_SHEET
DATED 9-16-87. THIS IOA WORKSHEET SHOULD BE _COMBINED _I_ ?:













































NEW [ X ]
MPS
1023
LO2 BLEED CHECK VALVE (CV31, 33, 35)
K.A. HOLDEN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ F ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IF THIS CHECK VALVE FAILS TO OPEN THE STANDPIPE DOES NOT GIVE THE
G_2AI_OVERFLOW CAPABILITY IFTHEL02 LEVEL IN THE POlO ....
ACCUMULATOR LEVEL LOWER. THIS MIGHT ALLOW GO2 INTO THE HPOTP
CAUSING UNCONTAINED ENGINE DAMAGE. GROUND CHECKOUT CANNOT
RELIABLY
INDICATE THAT BOTH DUAL REDUNDANT CHECK VALVES ARE OPERATING
PROPERLY. BOTH DUAL REDUNDANT CHECK VLAVES CAN FAIL TO OPEN
BECAUSE OF CONTAMINATION. NASA INFORMATION IS BASED ON THE
RI/NASA CRITICAL ITEMS LIST OF 12-23-87 AND THE RI/NASA CIL
WORKSHEET
OF 9-16-87.






NASA FMEA #: 0451-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






L02 BLEED CHECK VALVE (CV31, 33, 35)
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C .........
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE VALVE IS NO_LLY OpEN=DURING ENGINE OPERATION TO ALLOW GO2
TO FLOW FROM THE POGO ACCUMULATOR TO T_E _IF_LD. IOA WORKSHEET
1024 SHOULD BE DROPPED. NASA INFORMATION IS BASED ON THE RI/NASA






















NASA FMEA #: 0451-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LO2 BLEED CHECK VALVE (CV31, 33, 35)









NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ /NA ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ X] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
u
m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3/3 ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE RI/NASA CRITICAL ITEMS LIST (12-23-87) INDICATES 3/3A,
MEANING 3/3 FOR NOMINAL FLIGHT AND i/i FOR ABORT. THE RI/NASA
CIL WORKSHEET (DATED 9-16-87) DESCRIBES A FAILURE SEQUENCE THAT
CONFORMS TO A CRITICALITY OF 2/IR FOR ABORT. IOA RECOMMENDS
3/3 FOR NOMINAL AND 2/IR FOR ABORT, WITH THE MAIN OXIDIZER VALVE
AS THE REDUNDANT ITEM WHOSE FAILURE WOULD ALLOW LOSS OF
PROPELLANT.
n






NASA FMEA #: 0451-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 1026
ITEM: LO2 BLEED CHECK VALVE (CV31, 33, 35)
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
....... FLIGHT _ _ _.............._'
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /iR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]







RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA WORKSHEET ADDRESSES ONLY THE PERIOD BETWEEN MECO AND MPS
RELIABLY CERTIFY THAT THE DUAL REDUNDANT CHECK VALVES ARE BOTH
OPERATING PROPERLY. IOA WORKSHEET 1026 SHOULD BE CQMBI_D .......
n
WITH 1023. NASA INFORMATION IS BASED ON THE RI/NASA CRITICAL














NASA FMEA #: NA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LO2 BLEED CHECK VALVE (CV31, 33, 35)
K.A. HOLDEN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] C ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IT WAS ORIGINALLY REPORTED THAT THE FAILURE OF THE BLEED CHECK
VALVE TO CLOSE WOULD DELAY THE LAUNCH. SINCE THERE IS NO MONITOR
TO SHOW THE POSITION OF THIS CHECK VALVE, THE LAUNCH WOULD NOT BE
DELAYED. IOA WORKSHEET 1027 SHOULD BE DROPPED.
i






NASA FMEA #: 0451-1
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] _ [ NA] [ NA]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ F ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS IOa _WO_SH_ETAPPLIES 0N_I TO THE PRELA_CHII_SE. LOSS OF
T_PE__ _ _ONDITIONING _'_0R 0_ ENGINE MAY_AUSE -I?AUNCH DELAY
NASA INFORMATION IS BASED ON THE RI/NASA CRITICAL ITEMS LIST (12-
12-87) AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET 0451-1 DATED 9-16-87.































MPS-1031 BASELINE [ ]
0519-3 NEW [ X ]
MPS
1031
GO2 PRESSURE FLOW CONTROL VALVE (LV53, 54, 55)
K.A. HOLDEN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILURE OF TWO FLOW CONTROL VALVES MAY CAUSE VIOLATION OF SAFETY
LIMITS ON 02 ULLAGE PRESSURE. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE
ULLAGE PRESSURE TO FALL BELOW ITS MINIMUM ALLOWABLE VALVE. THIS
IS MONITORED AND WILL BE INDICATED TO THE CREW.
REF: RI/NASA CIL, NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING NOTES (J.E.
BORCHES).







NASA FMEA #: 0519-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







GO2 PRESSURE FLOW CONTROL VALVE (LV53, 54, 55)
K.A. HOLDEN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ F ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMP_E [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




SECON C TROL VAL _ Y PRESS E TO
FALL BELOW THE MINIMUM LEVEL REQUIRED FOR SAFETY. .......
REF: RI/NASA CIL 12-23-87, NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING (J.E.


















NASA FMEA #: 0519-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






GO2 PRESSURE FLOW CONTROL VALVE (LV53, 54, 55)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ F ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




SECOND FAILURE MAY CAUSE OVERPRESSURIZATION OF THE 02 TANK AND
VENTING OF 02. GROUND CHECKOUT SHOULD DETECT THE FAILURE TO
CLOSE. LOSS OF REDUNDANCY IS DETECTABLE BY INDICATIONS OF HIGH












NASA FMEA #: 0519-4
N_ASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






GO2 PRESSURE FLOW CONTROL VALVE (LV53, 54, 55)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different fromNASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ESCAPING 02 AND FIRE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE. REF: RI/NASA



































NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ]
MPS
1035
GO2 PRESSUREFLOW CONTROL VALVE (LV53, 54, 55)
K.A. HOLDEN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
C ] C ] C ] [ ]
w
u
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS IOA WORKSHEET SHOULD BE COMBINED WITH 1034. REF: RI/NASA
CIL OF 12-23-87 AND NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING NOTES (J.E.
BORCHES).
L






NASA FMEA #: 0408-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [_ ] ....












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




THiS IOA WORKSHEET SHOULD BE COMBINED WITH 1043. REF: RI/NASA ....























NASA FMEA #: 0408-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LO2 FEED (ORB/ET) DISCONNECT (PDI)
LEAD ANALYST" K.A. HOLDEN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
tomb
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE I/i CRITICALITY ON IOA WORKSHEET 1041 WAS NOT DRIVEN BY THE
FAILURE TO OPEN. FAILURE TO OPEN WILL CAUSE LAUNCH DELAY.
REF: NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING NOTES (J.E. BORCHES).
w







NASA FMEA #: 0408-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LO2 FEED (ORB/ET) DISCONNECT (PDI)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different fromNASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
......... (ADD/DELETE)


















































NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ]
MPS
1042
LO2 FEED (ORB/ET) DISCONNECT (PDI)
K.A. HOLDEN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /1 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
i
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CADD/DELETE)

















NASA FMEA #: 0408-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LO2 FEED (ORB/ET) DISCONNECT (PDI)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
































NASA FMEA #: 0408-7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LO2 FEED (ORB/ET) DISCONNECT (PDI)
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




PROPULSIVE VENTING OF RESIDUAL 02 MAY CAUSE ORBITER/ET RECONTACT
AND POSSIBLE DESTRUCTION OF THE VEHICLE.
REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 12-
15-87.
w













NEW [ X ]
MPS
1045
LO2 FEED (ORB/ET) DISCONNECT (PDI)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
































NASA _ #: 0408-6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






L02 FEED (ORB/ET) DISCONNECT (PDI)
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
i RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DAMAGE TO TPS TILES FROM CRYO EXPOSURE AND/OR LOSS OF HELIUM
DURING REPRESS CAUSING LOSS OF AFT COMPARTMENT PURGE CAPABILITY
CAN LEAD TO LOSS OF VEHICLE.







NASA FMEA #: 0513-4
NASA DATA-
BASELINE [ ]






GO2 PRESSURIZATION (ORB/ET) DISCONNECT (PD4)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


































NASA FMEA #: 0513-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







GO2 PRESSURIZATION (ORB/ET) DISCONNECT (PD4)
K.A. HOLDEN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE POSSIBILITY OF PRESSURIZATION LINE RUPTURE JUSTIFIES A
CRITICALITY OF i/I.









NASA FMEA #: 0513-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






GO2 PRESSURIZATION (ORB/ET) DISCONNECT(PD4)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




































NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ]
MPS
1053
GO2 PRESSURIZATION (ORB/ET) DISCONNECT (PD4)
K.A. HOLDEN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING
NOTES (J.E. BORCHES).






NASA FMEA #: NA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






GO2 PRESSURIZATION (ORB/ET) DISCONNECT (PD4)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] *
[X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




THIS IOA WORKSHEET SHOULD BE COMBINED WITH NO LOSS.
































NASA FMEA #: NA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






GO2 PRESSURIZATION (ORB/ET) DISCONNECT (PD4)





NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]



















NASA FMEA #: 0513-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






GO2 PRESSURIZATION (ORB/ET) DISCONNECT (PD4)
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
HDW/FUNC A B C
_ : CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
_: i__ii_i_!:_!_ _ _......
THE RI/NASA .........CIL INDICATES A i/I CRITICALITY DURING ABORTS FOR
THIS FAILURE MODE. IOA CONCURS.






































NASA FMEA #: 0517-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LO2 TANK PRE-PRESS (ORB/GND) DISC (PD9)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA I [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
u
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING NOTES (J.E. BORCHES).
w
2







NASA FMEA #: 0517-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LO2 TANK PRE-PRESS (ORB/GND) DISC (PD9)




HDW/_C A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS IO_WORKSHEET APPLIES ONLYT0 THE PRELAUNCH PHASE. IT ....


































NEW [ X ]
LO2 TANK PRE-PRESS (ORB/GND) DISC (PD9)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF REDUNDANCY WILL ALLOW LOSS OF ULLAGE PRESSURE AND
POSSIBLE ET STRUCTURAL FAILURE. ALL REDUNDANCY CANNOT BE LOST BY
A SINGLE EVENT.
REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING
NOTES (J.E. BORCHES).
m








NASA FMEA #: 0517-2
NASA DATA:
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 1064
ITEM: LO2 TANK PRE-PRESS (ORB/GND) DISC (PD9)
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN
ASSESSMENT:
_T
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY._,_,,._ SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS RI/NASA ANALYSIS APPLIES ONLY TO EXTERNAL LEAKAGE OF HELIUM.




























NASA FMEA #: 0517-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LO2 TANK PRE-PRESS (ORB/GND) DISC (PD9)
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
















NASA FMEA #: NA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]













HDW/_NC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






































NASA FMEA #: 0303-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LO2 GROUND FILL & DRAIN (ORB/GND) DISCONNECT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




LEAKAGE OF LO2 IS DECLARED BY NSTS 22206 TO BE A CRITICALITY i/i
ITEM. IOA WORKSHEET 1072 SHOULD BE COMBINED WITH 1073.











NASA FMEA #: 0303-6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LO2 GROUND FILL & DRAIN (ORB/GND) DISCONNECT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





























NASA FMEA #: 0406-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LO2 OVERBOARD BLEED (ORB/GND) DISCONNECT (PDI3)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
u
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING NOTES (J.E. BORCHES).
u








NASA FMEA #: 0406-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]

















NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ NA_ _ [ NA]- _ [ NA]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
































NASA FMEA #: 0406-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LO2 OVERBOARD BLEED (ORB/GND) DISCONNECT (PDI3)
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






















NASA DATA" _..... .
BASELINE [ ] - :
NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ]
MPS
1083
LO2 OVERBOARD BLEED (ORB/GND) DISCONNECT (PDI3)
K.A. HOLDEN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] _
[ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
















































NASA FMEA #: 0406-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LO2 OVERBOARD BLEED (ORB/GND) DISCONNECT (PDI3)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /1R J [ P J [ F J [ P J [ X J *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 11-17-
87.
w









NASA FMEA #: 0406-2
NASA DATA: _
BASELINE [ ]






LO2 OVERBOARD BLEED (ORB/GND) DISCONNECT (PDI3)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




THIS IOA WORKSHEET SHOULD BE COMBINED WITH 1084. REF:
























NASA FMEA #: 0516-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








GO2 PRESSURIZATION MANIFOLD TEST POINT COUPLING
K.A. HOLDEN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)























NEW [ X ]
MPS
1092
GO2 PRESSURIZATION MANIFOLD TEST POINT COUPLING
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS -CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
[ F ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /1 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILURE MODE IS EXTERNXL LEAF_4E_oF THE couPL_NG, NOT INTERNAL
SEAL LEAKAGE. THIS FMEA SHOULD BE DROPPED, OR ITS FAILURE MODE
REVISED TO REFLECT THE SCENARIO DESCRIBED.





























NASA FMEA #: NA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







GO2 PRESSURIZATION MANIFOLD TEST POINT COUPLING




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




COMBUSTION OF THE COMPONENT WILL ALLOW ESCAPE OF 02, CREATING A
FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD THAT CAN DESTROY THE VEHICLE.
w









NASA FMEA #: NA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







GO2 PRESSURIZATION MANIFOLD TEST POINT COUPLING





HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
































NASA FMEA #: NA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LO2 PREVALVE (PVI, 2, 3)





NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





























NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]




[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]







[ X ] *
ix]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) _
....... ADEQUATE [ ]
......... INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS-

































NASA FMEA #: 0401-9
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LO2 PREVALVE (PVI, 2, 3)
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 12-15-
87.
L






NASA FMEA #: 0401-7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LO2 PREVALVE (PVl , 2, 3 )




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N/ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




THE PREVALVE HAS A BYPASS RELIEF VALVE AS WELL AS VISOR RELIEF.
AD_TONAL _"L_ CAPABILI_IS PROVIDE BY THE HPOT SEALS. RELIEF
FUNCTION IS CONSIDERED STANDBY REDUNDANT.



















NASA FMEA #: 0401-5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LO2 PREVALVE (PVI, 2, 3)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




POSITION SWITCH INDICATORS MAY FALSELY INDICATE OPEN IF THE
FAILURE IS CAUSED BY A PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE. THEREFORE,
SCREEN B SHOULD FAIL.
REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 12-15-
87.










NASA FMEA #: 0401-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LO2 PREVALVE (PVl, 2, 3)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA ANALYSIS ADDRESSED FAILURE TO CLOSE FOLLOWING MPS DUMP ONLY.
_'__H_E_S__C_MB_ED W_H_108.





























NASA FMEA #: 0401-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






L02 PREVALVE (PVl, 2, 3)
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 12-15-
87.
u














LO2 PREVALVE (PVl, 2, 3)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C _ ......
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )







































NASA FMEA #: 0414-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LO2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE (PV7)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING NOTES.
C ]
[ ]










NASA FMEA #: 0414-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LO2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE (PV7)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ESCAPING L02 IS CONSIDERED A CRITICALITY 1 SITUATION. _






























NASA FMEA #: 0414-7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LO2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE (PV7)
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ / ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
C ] C ] C ]
[ x ] *
ix]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: R/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 8-23-
87.
w





NASA FMEA #: 0414-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LO2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE (PV7)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RE__CY E_STS TQ RELIEVE THE _IFQL_ _F THIS FAILURE OC_S.
MANIFOLD PRESSURE INDICATORS SUPPORT PASSAGE OF SCREEN S.




































NASA FMEA #: 0311-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LO2 OUTBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PV9)
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] IF] [P]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS IOA WORKSHEET ADDRESSED PRELAUNCH FAILURES ONLY. THE i/i
CRITICALITY WAS DRIVEN BY THE FAILURE TO REMAIN OPEN, WHILE THE
NASA FAILURE MODE WAS FAIL TO OPEN. FAILURE TO OPEN FOR MPS
INERT HAS NO EFFECT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE MANIFOLD






















LO2 OUTBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PV9)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
.... ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:











































MPS-II32 BASELINE [ ]
0311-9 NEW [ X ]
MPS
1132
LO2 OUTBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PV9)
K.A. HOLDEN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ i /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 12-14-
87.






NASA FMEA #: 0311-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LO2 OUTBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PV9)








NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE RI/NAS_ ANALYSIS IDENTIF-IE_A I/i CRiTiCALITY FOR RTLS AND
TAL ABORTS. IOA CONCURS WITH THIS _SULT.
REF:
87.
























NASA FMEA #: 0311-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LO2 OUTBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PV9)





NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ ] CN] [ ]
CIL
ITEM









(If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE RI/NASA ANALYSIS IDENTIFIED A i/i CRITICALITY FOR RTLS AND
TAL ABORTS. IOA CONCURS WITH THIS RESULT.











NASA FMEA #: 0311-9
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






L02 OUTBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PV9)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF VEHICLE CAN OCCUR UPON FIRST FAILURE DURING LOADING OR
DUMP.

































NASA FMEA #: 0311-6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LO2 OUTBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PV9)
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] IF] [P]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE RUPTURE OF THE MANIFOLD.
REF: RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEWMEETING NOTES.
i
m







NASA FMEA #: 0311-4
NASA DATa:
BASELINE [ ]






LO2 OUTBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PV9)
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDA/_CY SCREENS -
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P] [F] [ P] [ X] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)









































NASA FMEA #: 0310-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LO2 INBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PVI0)
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] [P] [P]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS IOA ANALYSIS ADDRESSED PRELAUNCH FAILUES ONLY. THE i/i
CRITICALITY WAS DRIVEN BY THE FAILURE TO REMAIN OPEN, WHILE THE
NASA FAILURE MODE WAS FAIL TO OPEN. FAILURE TO OPEN FOR MPS
INERT HAS NO EFFECT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDNACY MAY CAUSE MANIFOLD
RUPTURE. REF: RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 12-10-87.
w







NASA FMEA #: 0310-6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LO2 INBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PVI0)
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
t / J [ J c l t i [
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) _ ....
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]



























NASA FMEA #: 0310-10
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LO2 INBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PVI0)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
















NASA FMEA #: 0310-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LO2 INBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PVlO)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


























NASA FMEA #: 0310-7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LO2 INBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PVI0)
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] IF] [P]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IN] IN] IN]
[ x ] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAN CAUSE RUPTURE OF THE MANIFOLD.











NASA FMEA #: 0310-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LO2 INBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PVl0)







NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)







































NASA FMEA #: NA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LO2 INBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PVI0)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]




COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


















NASA FMEA #: 0310-10
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LO2 INBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PVI0)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ I /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )

















































NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ _ ] ....
NEW [ X ]
MPS
1171




[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]







[ X ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




THE RI/NASA ANALYSIS INDICATES A i/I CRITICALITY FOR A PAD ABORT
(PRELAUNCH). IOA CdNC_Wi_'THIS RESULT_ .....REF: R_/NASA CIL OF
12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 11-13-87.
m
w






NASA FMEA #: 0452-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LO2 BLEED SHUTOFF VALVE (PVI9)
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOa [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




L02 OVERBOARD LEAKAGE IS DEFINED TO BE A i/i CRITICALITY.
































NASA FMEA #: 0452-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LO2 BLEED SHUTOFF VALVE (PVI9)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X J *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CADD/DELETE)




SECOND FAILURE WILL ALLOW OVERBOARD LEAKAGE OF LO2.
REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 11-13-
87.
i







NASA FMEA #: 0452-7
NASA DATA:
_ASELI_ [ ]






LO2 BLEED SHUTOFF VALVE (PVI9)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
































NASA FMEA #: 0452-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LO2 BLEED SHUTOFF VALVE (PVlg)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 11-13-
87.






NASA FMEA #: NA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LO2 BLEED SHUTOFF VALVE (PVI9)
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM




[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
[ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
[ N/N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)































NASA FMEA #: 0453-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LO2 POGO ACCUMULATOR RECIRCULATION VALVE (PV20,




CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE RI/NASA ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A i/I CRITICALITY FOR PAD ABORTS
(PRELAUNCH). THE SECOND FAILURE CITED (LEAK IN ENGINE OR LINE)
IS NOT A VALID REDUNDANCY FOR THE POGO VALUES. REF: RI/NASA CIL
OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 10-17-87.







NASA FMEA #: 0453-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LO2 POGO ACCUMULATOR RECIRCULATION VALVE (PV20,




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [








































NASA FMEA #: 0453-7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LO2 POGOACCUMULATOR RECIRCULATION VALVE (PV20,





NASA [ 1 /i ]




[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)















NASA FMEA #: 0453-6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LO2 POGO ACCUMULATOR RECIRCULATION VALVE (PV20,




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)I
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











































NASA FMEA #: 0453-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LO2 POGO ACCUMULATOR RECIRCULATION VALVE (PV20,





NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]



















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF REDUNDANT ITEMS IS NOT READILY DETECTABLE. REF:












NASA FMEA #: 0427-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LO2 LOW LEVEL LIQUID SENSOR (MTI, 2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS ASSESSMENT ALSO COVERS THE LH2 ECO SENSORS. TWO SENSORS
INbiC_TING WET WILL ALLO_NGINE_TO RUN, RESULTING _N DEPLETION






























NASA FMEA #: 0427-5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LO2 LOW LEVEL LIQUID SENSOR (MTI, 2)
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS ASSESSMENT ALSO COVERS THE LH2 ECO SENSORS. TWO SENSORS
INDICATING DRY WILL CAUSE AN ENGINE SHUTDOWN COMMAND TO BE GIVEN.
REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87.
w








NASA FMEA #: 0410-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LO2 SYSTEM DELTA P TRANSDUCER (MT44, 50)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





























NASA FMEA #: 0410-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






L02 SYSTEM DELTA P TRANSDUCER (MT44, 50)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
u
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

















NASA FMEA #: NA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicabiei
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
__ILURE MODE-IS: ADDRESSED IN_:THE _AL_SIS _ OF THE GO2

























NASA FMEA #: NA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LO2 17 INCH ORBITER DISCONNECT TEST PORT (TPI7,




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




THIS FAILURE MODE IS ADDRESSED IN THE ANALYSIS OF THE LO2












NASA FMEA #: NA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LO2 FEEDLINE RELIEF TEST PORT (TP24)
K.A. HOLDEN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] [ ]
[p] [F] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




THIS FAILURE MODE IS ADDRESSED IN THE ANALYSIS OF THE LO2 RELIEF






















NASA FMEA #: NA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






L02 FEEDLINE MANIFOLD (MAI)





NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)














NASA FMEA #: 0419-2
NASA DATA: _ _
BASELINE [ ]






LO2 FEEDLINE MANIFOLD (MAI)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


































NASA FMEA #: 0419-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






L02 FEEDLINE MANIFOLD (MAI)





NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




























NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
MPS-1244
0419-1
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MPS
1244




[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [































NASA FMEA #: NA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LO2 FILL & DRAIN LINE (FHI)





NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)














NASA FMEA #: 0306-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LO2 FILL & DRAIN LINE (FH1)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /1 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
c / l E 3 c 1 E 1 [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS ANALYSIS IS FOR THE UNINSULATED LINE (OVI02). REF:



























NASA FMEA #: 0306-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LO2 FILL & DRAIN LINE (FHI)





NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA FMEA #: 0307-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






L02 FILL & DRAIN LINE (FH1)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




THIS ANALYSIS IS FOR THE FOAM-INSULATED LINE. REF:


























NASA FMEA #: 0307-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LO2 FILL & DRAIN LINE (FHI)





NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




THIS ANALYSIS IS FOR THE FOAM-INSULATED LINE. REF:


















LO2 17 INCH FEEDLINE (FH2)





NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]









































NASA FMEA #: 0459-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






L02 17 INCH FEEDLINE (FH2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ X] *
IX]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS ANALYSIS IS FOR THE FOA INSULATED LINE. REF:



















LO2 17 INCH FEEDLINE (FH2)











NASA [ i /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
ADD/DELETE)
































COMPARE [ / ]
MPS
1263




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOa [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS ANALYSIS IS FOR THE FOAM INSULATED LINE. THIS IOA WORKSHEET
SHOULD BE COMBINED WITH 1262.
w
m
















NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MPS
1264




[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS ANALYSIS IS FOR THE FOAM INSULATED LINE. REF:



































L02 17 INCH FEEDLINE (FH2)





NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




THIS ANALYSIS IS FOR THE VACUUM JACKETED LINE. REF:











NASA FMEA #: NA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LO2 12 INCH FEEDLINE (FH3, 4, 5)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




































NASA FMEA #: 0420-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LO2 12 INCH FEEDLINE (FH3, 4, 5)
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ HA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




THIS ANALYSIS IS FOR THE VACUUM JACKETED LINE (OVI02). REF:
RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 12-14-87.






NASA FMEA #: 0460-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS ANALYSIS IS FOR THE FOAM INSULATED LINE. REF:






































NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
MPS-1273
0420-2
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MPS
1273




[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]







[ X ] *
ix]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If differentfrom NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA FMEA #: 0412-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LO2 FEED MANIFOLD RELIEF VALVE (RVS)
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
CP] [F] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
[x]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LEAKAGE OF LO2 FROM THE SENSE LINE CAN OCCUR WITHOUT A PRIOR


























NASA FMEA #: 0412-5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LO2 FEED MANIFOLD RELIEF VALVE (RV5)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LEAKAGE OF LO2 FROM THE SENSE LINE CAN OCCUR WITHOUT A PRIOR
FAILURE OF THE ISOLATION VALVE.
w
u








NASA FMEA #: 0412-2
NASA DATA: :
BASELINE [ ]






LO2 FEED MANIFOLD RELIEF VALVE (RVS)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE:_RI/NASA __I:IIS F_ AFAI_I__T FOLLOWING RELIEF.
IOA'S _ALYSIS REFERS TO FAILURE To _MAIN CLOSED D_ING ENGINE




























NASA FMEA #: 0412-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LO2 FEED MANIFOLDRELIEF VALVE (RV5)
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




SECOND FAILURE WILL ALLOW LEAKAGE OF LO2. REF: RI/NASA CIL OF
12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 10-5-87.
W








NASA FMEA #: 0412-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LO2 FEED MANIFOLD RELIEF VALVE (RVS)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REDUNDANCY EXISTS TO RELIEVE MANIFOLD PRESSURE. REF: RI/NASA




























NASA FMEA #: 0609-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






GO2 PRESSURE MANIFOLD REPRESS ORIFICE (RPI)





NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )



























NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]




[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ,] [ <] [_ .]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:































NASA FMEA #: 0301-7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






















NEW [ X ]
MPS
2002
LH2 INBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PVI2)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC !A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




























NASA FMEA #: 0301-6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LH2 INBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PVI2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
















NASA FMEA #: 0301-2
NASA DATA: _
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
[P] [P] [P] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FROZEN H2 WOULD THAW AND BOIL OFF OR SUBLIMATE AND BE VENTED
THROUGH THE RELIEF SYSTEM OR DURING MPS INERT.









































MPS-2005 BASELINE [ ]
0301-5 NEW [ X ]
MPS
2005
I/{2 INBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PVI2)
W.J.MCNICOLL
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


















NASA FMEA #: 0301-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /iR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IX]*
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
VALVE FAILURE TO CLOSE iS ADDRESSED ON 0301-2. INDICATOR FAILURE
MAY CAUSE LAUNCH SCRUB.



















NASA FMEA #: 0301-10
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LH2 INBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PVI2)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


















NASA FMEA #: 0302-6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )














































NASA FMEA #: 0302-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ) [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ) [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
: ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:












NASA FMEA #: 0302-5
NASA DATA: ......
BASELINE [ ]






LH2 OUTBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PVII)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
[ X ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




TWO FAILURES ARE REQUIRED BEFORE MANIFOLD RUPTURE OR HAZARDOUS
VENTING ARE POSSIBLE.































NASA FMEA #: 0302-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
[ 3/3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / 3 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




RI/NASA ANALYSIS INDICATES I/i CRITICALITY FOR RTLS AND TAL
ABORTS. IOA CONCURS.
REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 11-23-
87.
=















NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MPS
2015
LH2 OUTBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PVlI)
W.J.MCNICOLL
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IN] [N] IN]
[ x ] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILURE TO CLOSE IS ADDRESSED ON 0302-2• INDICATOR FAILURE MAY
CAUSE LAUNCH SCRUB.


























NASA FMEA #: 0302-9
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 12-14-
87.






NASA FMEA #: 0308-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]













HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE C / ] C ] [ ] C ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












































NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COHPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MPS
2022




[ ] [ ]












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



























NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MPS
2023




[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






























NASA FMEA #: 0303-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 2031






HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )


















NASA FMEA #: 0303-6
NASA DATA: ......
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MPS _
MDAC ID: 2031






HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / J [ ] [ ] [ ] [ J
(ADD/DELETE)






































NASA FMEA #: 0432-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 11-13-
87.







NASA FMEA #: 0432-2
NASA DATA:
BASELi_ [ ]








LH2 HI POINT BLEED (ORB/GND) DISCONNECT (ORB
W.J.MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




































NASA FMEA #: 0432-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LH2 HI POINT BLEED (ORB/GND) DISCONNECT (ORB
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)













ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/88 NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-2044 BASELINE [ ]
NASA FMEA #: 0432-5 NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 2044




CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)















































NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





















LH2 REPLENISH VALVE (PVl3)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]





HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)













































NASA FMEA #: 0304-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LH2 REPLENISH VALVE (PVI3)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOa [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




MANIFOLD PRESSURE INDICATOR AND ALARM SUPPORTS PASSAGE OF SCREEN
B.









NASA FMEA #: 0304-4
NASA DATA:
B_SELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If differen£ from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ...........
_ ADEQUATE [ ]
- INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:





















































NEW [ X ]
MPS
2055
LH2 REPLENISH VALVE (PVI3)
W.J.MCNICOLL
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
I OA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 11-11-
87.
w







NASA FMEA #: 0431-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [










































NASA FMEA #: 0431-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)















NASA FMEA #: 0431-8
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C































NASA FMEA #: 0410-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
i RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




FOR MT44 ONLY. REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA
FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING NOTES.






NASA FMEA #: 0410-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
































NASA FMEA #: 0429-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LH2 HI POINT BLEED LINE (FH19)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS ANALYSIS IS FOR THE VACUUM JACKETED LINE.
REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 6-17-
87.






NASA FMEA #: 0430-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LH2 HI POINT BLEED LINE (FH19)
W.J.MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
_DW/nmC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA ] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS ANALYSIS IS FOR THE FORM INSULATED LINE.














































HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE C N IN ] C N ] C N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)































HDW/_C A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS ANALYSIS IS FOR THE VACUUM JACKETED LINE. THE LINE IS OPEN
































NASA FMEA #: 0405-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)















NASA FMEA #: 0405-2
NASA DATA: ....
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[P] IF] [P] IX]*
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RELIEF VALVE (SV7) PROVIDES _D_D_Cy. _ _ _
REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF Ii-17 -
87,







NASA FMEA #: 0405-6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LH2 RECIRCULATION DISCONNECT VALVE (PD3)
W.J.MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
















NASA FMEA #: 0405-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LH2 RECIRCULATION DISCONNECT VALVE (PD3)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]





































NASA FMEA #: 0405-10
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LH2 RECIRCULATION DISCONNECT VALVE (PD3)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
g RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)















NASA FMEA #: 0403-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LH2 RECIRCULATION PUMP VALVE (PVI4, PV15, PVI6)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]








RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

















NASA FMEA #: 0403-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IX] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
r
z
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE RI/NASA 2/IR CRITICALITY APPLIES TO ABORT ONLY. THE SECOND
FAILURE CITED (FEED LINE LEAK) IS NOT A REDUNDANCY TO THE VALVE.





















LH2 RECIRCULATION PUMP VALVE (PVI4, PVIS, PVI6)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/_C A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE



































MPS-2111 BASELINE [ ]
0309-2 NEW [ X ]
MPS
2111
LH2 PRESTART CONDITIONING MANIFOLD (MA3)
W.J.MCNICOLL
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE C / ] [ ] C ] C ] C ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


















NASA FMEA #: 0309-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]








RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
































NASA FMEA #: NA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ N IN ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

























NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ]
MPS
2114
LH2 PRESTART CONDITIONING MANIFOLD (MA3)
W. J. MCNICOLL
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING NOTES.
i
I




















NASA FMEA #: 0421-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]













NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


















NASA FMEA #: NA
NASA DATA: _
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)










































NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MPS
2123




[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [




















NASA FMEA #: 0425-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LH2 PRESTART CONDITIONING RETURN LINE (FHI2,
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





































NASA FMEA #: 0425-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )













NASA FMEA #: NA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
C ] *
[ ]
COMPARE C N /N ] C N ] C N ] C N ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ii_.,__,
ADEQUATE [ ]






























NASA FMEA #: 0425-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] C NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)














NASA FMEA #: 0309-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C k
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA FMEA #: NA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 0309-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMP_ [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





































NASA FMEA #: 0309-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] E NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] E ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
,, ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:









NASA FMEA #: NA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



















NASA FMEA #: 0309-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [



















NASA FMEA #: 0411-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LH2 RECIRCULATION MANIFOLD RELIEF VALVE (RV7)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P] [F] [P]





RECO_NDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




PROPELLANT BLEED VLAVES PROVIDE A REDUNDANT RELIEF PATH.

























NASA FMEA #: 0411-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LH2 RECIRCULATION MANIFOLD RELIEF VALVE (RV7)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ X] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 11-13-87 INDICATES A 3/3 CRITICALITY
WHILE RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 SHOWS 2/IR. NO SUPPORTTING
RATIONALE AVAILABLE.
b







NASA FMEA #: 0411-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

































NASA FMEA # : NA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)















NASA FMEA #: NA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
























NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]










[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


















NASA FMEA #: 0404-1
N_A DATa:
_ELI_ [ ]















NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
C ] *
C ]
COMPARE [ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


































NASA FME #: NA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] C NA] C NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

























NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MPS ....
2175




[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]







































NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
NASA DATA:
MPS-2176 BASELINE [ ]
NA NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MPS
2176




[ ] [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



















_ELI_E [ _ ]
NEW[X]
COMPARE [ / ]
MPS
2177
LH2 RECIRCULATION PUMP (PP1, PP2, PP3)
W.J.MCNICOLL
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C _
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



































NASA FMEA #: 0502-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






















NEW [ X ]
MPS
2182




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

































NASA FMEA #: 0502-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING
NOTES.






















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )





































NASA FMEA #: 0505-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 2192
ITEM: GH2 PRESSURIZATION ISOLATION CHECK VALVE





HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




























GH2 PRESSURIZATION FLOW CONTROL VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS _ CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ F ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ......
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]





































NEW [ X ]
MPS
2202







HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ F ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
CO.ARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING
NOTES.
L_






















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]_ [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






















































HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



















NASA FMEA #: 0503-6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA CRI_I_LITY WAS DRIVEN _By THE FAILURE TO REMAIN OPEN.


























NASA FMEA #: 0503-5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
_ ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING
NOTES.









NASA FMEA #: 0503-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






GH2 PRESSURIZATION DISCONNECT (PDS)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COHPARE [ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

































NASA FMEA #: 0503-7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






GH2 PRESSURIZATION DISCONNECT (PD5)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
























NEW [ X ]
MPS
2221
LH2 TANK GROUND PRE-PRESS DISCONNECT (PDI0)
W.J.MCNICOLL
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



































NASA FMEA #: 0501-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
































HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS _ _ ..... _ _ _....................
THE RI/NASA _ALYSIs ADDRESSEs FAILUR_ DURI_NGLOAD_ _ONLY._I_
ANALYSIS FOR THE PRELAUNCH PHASE ONLY IS NOT NECESSARY. THE_
O5Ol-2 n_/CIL SHOULD BE COMBINED WIT. 0501-4.




















NASA FMEA #: 0501-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
















NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
[P] IF] [P]
[P] [F] IF]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


























GH2 PRESSURIZATION MANIFOLD TEST POINT COUPLING
LEAD ANALYST: W. J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
_ITICALITY RED_DANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGNT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[F] [F] [F]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
THE FAILURE MODE SPECIFIES LEAKAGE WHICH IS PRES_D TO BE AN
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE CAUSED BY A SINGLE FAILURE. THIS ANALYSIS
SHOULD BE _ISED OR DELETED.












NASA FMEA #: 0516-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING
NOTES.

















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
MPS-2241 _ELINE [ ]
NA NEW [ X ]
MPS
2241












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIs F_LURE IS COVERED UNDER_AKAGE OF THE LINE FROM CVI7 TO















































HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] E ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




THIS FAILURE IS COVERED UNDER LEAKAGE OF THE CHECK VALVE (CV21,
22, 23), ON IOA WORKSHEET 2192; RI/NASA 0505-4.
=
u















LH2 FEED DISCONNECT VALVE (PD2)
LEAD ANALYST: W. J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )











































HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE CRITICALITY DETERMINED ON IOA 2261 WAS DRIVEN BY THE FAILURE
TO REMAIN OPEN, NOT THE FAILURE TO OPEN.
REF: RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING NOTES.






NASA FMEA #: 0407-7
NASA DATA:
BASELI_ [ _ _]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 2262
ITEM: LH2 FEED DISCONNECT VALVE (PD2)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE C / ] C ] [ ] C ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)





































LH2 FEED DISCONNECT VALVE (PD2)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
u
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 12-15-
87.
i








NASA FMEA #: 0407-4
NASA DATA:







LH2 FEED DISCONNECT VALVE (PD2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






































NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ]
MPS
2263
LH2 FEED DISCONNECT VALVE (PD2)
W.J.MCNICOLL
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
[ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
























NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ / ]
N_A DATA.: _







[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]







[ X ] *
[x]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )


















































LH2 PREVALVE (PV4, PV5, PV6)









HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA CRITICALITY WAS DRIVEN BY THE FAILURE TO REMAIN OPEN.
FAILURE TO OPEN FOR LH2 DUMP HAS REDUNDANCY, THIS CIL WORKSHEET
SHOULD ADDRESS PRELAUNCH FAILURE ALSO.
REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 12-15-
87.
w



















NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[ p ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




INTE'_ACING suBSYSTEMS (MFV)_ A_S__oT_ BE OPERATINCWITR _
TOLE_CE_(NST--S:22206, 2.3_2d). _ ?Ai_ HAS NO EFFECT.
























NASA FMEA #: 0402-10
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ I /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




























NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE PREVALVE HAS TWO RELIEF PATHS. .... _




































NASA FMEA #: 0402-6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





























HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] *
Ix]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicablei
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
THIS FAILURE IS coVE-RED'UNDER _EXTERNA__GE OF :_ ......THE D_S CONNECT




































NEW [ X ]
MPS
2291
LH2 FEEDLINE MANIFOLD (MA2)
W.J.MCNICOLL
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
w
mmm
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MPS
2292




[ ] [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)








































NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
MPS-2293
0416-1










[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (if different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



























LH2 17 INCH FEEDLINE (FH7)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/_C A _ B C .......
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ]










































NASA [ / ]
IOA [ i /1 ]









NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] [ ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILURE WILL PREVENT TANK FILL, TEMPERATURE CONDITIONING OR

























HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ x] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



































NASA FMEA #: 0417-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LH2 12 INCH FEEDLINE (FH8,FHg,FHI0)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)















NASA FMEA #: NA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LH2 12 INCH FEEDLINE (FH8,FHg,FH10)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ] C ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [, ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILURE WILL PREVENT TEMPERATURE CONDITIONING AND ENGINE START.

























NASA FMEA #: 0417-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LH2 12 INCH FEEDLINE (FH8, FH9, FHI0)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE C / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)

















NASA FMEA #: 0437-1
NASA DATA: ...._
BASEL_ [ ]




M_S _ _ _
2321
LH2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE (PV8)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] C ] [ ] [ 3 C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)







































NASA FMEA #: 0437-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




IOA_ITICALITY WAS DR_vE_ BY THE FAIL_ _TO _IN CLOSED.
LOSS OF CREW OR VEHICLE FOR FAILURE TO CLOSE.



























HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RELIEF VALVE WILL NOT CRACK AT NORMAL OPERATING _PRESSURE.



































NEW [ X ]
MPS
2323




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


































IOA [ 3 /3
COMPARE [ N /N
] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
] [N] IN] IN] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE IS COVERED UNDER LEAKAGE OF THE RELIEF LINE ON IOA



























NASA FMEA #: 0436-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






























HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[x] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILURE OF BOTH THE RELIEF VALVE AND THE ISOLATION VALVE WILL
ALLOW LEAKAGE OF LH2 _SU_LT_GINPOSSIBLE _S_0_ '_/VEHICLE.









































LH2 FEEDLINE MANIFOLD RELIEF VALVE (RV6)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT :
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (if different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE RI/NASAANALYSIS INDICATES A CRITICALITY OF i/I FOR ABORT.
IOA CONCh. .............
REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 8-20-
87.
w






NASA FMEA #: 0436-5
NASA DATA:

















NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
CO_ARZ [ N /H ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LH2 FROM THE SENSE LINE WILL LEAK UPON__R$_T_I_2 ...............















NASA FMEA #: 0436-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS RI/NASA ANALYSIS SHOULD BE COMBINED WITH 0436-5.









NASA FMEA #: 0608-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LH2 DUMP PRESSURIZATION ORIFICE (RP10)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RELIEF SYSTEMS ARE NOT REDUNDANT TO THE ORIFICE.



























NASA FMEA #: 0608-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
u
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING
NOTES.


















LH2 FEEDLINE RELIEF FLAME ARRESTOR (FLI)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B _ C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE RI/NASA ANALY$_ISFQR _ CO_PLE_TEB_CKAGE OF FLOW.





























NASA FMEA #: 0512-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)















NASA FMEA #: 0512-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] C





































NASA FMEA #: 0512-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] C ]
m
m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

















NASA FMEA #: 0651-3
NASA DATA:






LH2 FEED RTLS INBOARD VALVE (PVI7)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/_C A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [. ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





BOTH IOA AND RI/NASA INDICATE A CRITICALITY OF i/i FOR RTLS
AB_T. ............... '.............





























NASA FMEA #: 0651-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
















NASA FMEA #: 0651-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]

















NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
[P] [F] [F]
[P] [F] IF]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ D ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
: ___! ! _ii_ _....
REF: RI/NASA OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL_iEW MEETING
. I Es .......
IOA CRITICALITY WAS DRIVEN BY FAILURE TO REMAIN CLOSED DURING
ASCENT. FAILURE TO CLOSE POST-MECO HAS NO EFFECT ON A NOMINAL







































MPS-2383 BASELINE [ ]
0651-9 NEW [ X ]
MPS
2383
LH2 FEED RTLS INBOARD VALVE (PV17)
W.J.MCNICOLL
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] C ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If differentrfrom NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING
NOTES.
k






NASA FMEA #: 0651-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ];
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MPS _
MDAC ID: 2391
ITEM: LH2 FEED RTLS OUTBOARD VALVE (PVI8)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE ;_ [ _ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
BOTH IOA AND RI/NASA INDICATE A CRITICALITY OF 1/1 FOR ABORT.


























NASA FMEA #: 0651-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LH2 FEED RTLS OUTBOARD VALVE (PV18)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING
NOTES.
m





NASA FMEA #: 0651-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




REF: RI/NASA OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING
NOTES, ................ _i_ ........ _ _ ........_ _.....
IOA CRITICALITY WAS DRIVEN BY FAILURE TO REMAIN CLOSED DURING
ASCENT. FAILURE TO CLOSE POST-MECO HAS NO EFFECT ON A NOMINAL






























NASA FMEA #: 0651-9
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
































HDW/FUNC A _ B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DE_TE)




A SINGLE _NGINE S_DQ_ _ILL CAUSE _ I_NTACT ABQRT_ NO LOSS OF
CREW OR VEHICLE, NSTS 22206 2'3.3L _QUIP_ES A SSIGN_NT 0F 3/1R.































NASA FMEA #: 0202-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING NOTES.
C ]
[ ]












NASA DATA: _ _
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MPS
3020





HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




SECOND FAILURE (CVI, 2, 3) WILL CAUSE LOSS OF HELIUM AND AN
ENGINE SHUTDOWN. FAILURE OF ANOTHER CHECK VALVE WILL CAUSE A
SECOND ENGINE SHUTDOWN AND LOSS OF VEHICLE. SCREEN C SHOULD
PASS.


























NASA FMEA #: 0201-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
[P] [F] [P] [X]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)





SECOND FAILURE (CVI, 2, 3 FAIL TO CHECK) WILL CAUSE LOSS OF
HELIUM AND AN ENGINE SHUTDOWN. FAILURE OF ANOTHER CHECK VALVE
WILL CAUSE A SECOND ENGINE SHUTDOWN AND LOSS OF VEHICLE.
ANALYSIS 0201-3 COULD BE COMBINE WITH 0201-4.












NASA FMEA #: 0201-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) _
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
SECOND FAILURE (CVI, 2, 3 FAIL TO CHECK) WILL CAUSE LOSS OF
HELIUM AND AN ENGINE SHUTDOWN. FAILURE OF ANOTHER CHECK VALVE
WILL CAUSE A SECOND ENGINE SHUTDOWN AND =_SS OF VEHICLE.
































NASA FMEA #: NA
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 3030
ITEM: TEST PORT (TP8)




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE IS COVERED UNDER RI/NASA 0234-1 AND IOA 4620,
RUPTURE OF THE HELIUM FILL LINE.
m
m




















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECO_NDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)







































NASA FMEA #: 0203-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






4.7 CU. FT. HELIUM SUPPLY TANK (TKI,2,3,7,9,11)
LEAD ANALYST: M. L. MCNEELY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMP_ [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
















NASA FMEA #: 0203-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










HDW/FUNC A _ B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ P] [ P] [ P] IX] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS RI/N_A ANALYSIS SHOULD BE COMBINED WITH 0203r2. POSSIBLE
O_RPRESSURIZATION.
































NASA FMEA #: 0257-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
mmm
n
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING
NOTES.














PRESSURE TAP PORT (TP26,27,28)
LEAD ANALYST: M.L. MCNEELY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM




[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
[ 2 /2 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
[ N/N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE IS COVERED UNDER RI/NASA 0252-1 AND IOA 4620,



























NASA FMEA #: 0258-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW C x ]
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 3070






HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




SINGLE FAILURE WILL HAVE NO EFFECT. LEAKAGE OF UPSTREAM LINE IS
A SINGLE FAILURE POINT.











ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/ 03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-3070A









CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ..... ITEM
" HDW/_C A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ]





COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




VALVE iS NOT _QUIRED TO REMAIN CLOSED.



































NEW [ X ]
MPS
3071







HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILURE OF BOTH CHECK VALVES IN AN ENGINE SYSTEM WILL CAUSE
ENGINE SHUTDOWN AND LOSS OF MISSION. NSTS 22206 2.3.3L REQUIRES
ASSIGNMENT OF 3/IR.
REF: RI/NASA FMEA/CILREVIEW MEETING NOTES.
i


















CRITICALITY _ REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
Loss OF REDUNDANCYRESULTS I_ S_DOWN OF ON_ ENGI_ AND LOSS OF
MISSION. NSTS 22206 2.3.3L REQUIRES ASSIGNMENT OF 3/IR.





























NASA FMEA #: 0242-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
[P] IF] [P] IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




SINGLE FAILURE CAN CAUSE OVERPRESSURIZATION.





















ENGINE HELIUM SUPPLY FILTER - PANEL A;B




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] *
[X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)



































NASA FMEA #: 0204-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







ENGINE HELIUM SUPPLY ISOLATION VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: M.L.MCNEELY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[P] CP] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE )




THE IOA CRITICALITY WAS DRIVEN BY THE FAILURE TO REMAIN OPEN.
EFFECT OF FAILURE TO OPEN.
REF: RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING NOTES.
NO
m







NASA FMEA #: 0204-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







ENGINE HELIUM SUPPLY ISOLATION VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: M.L.MCNEELY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
_HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




SECOND FAILURE WILL CAUSE ENGINE SHUTDOWN AND LOSS OF MISSION.
NSTS 22206 2.3.3L REQUIRES ASSIGNMENT OF 3/IR.

































(LVI, 2 ;3,4 ;5,6)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MPS
3091
ENGINE HELIUM SUPPLY ISOLATION VALVE






HDW/FUNC A B C
] *
]
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ]COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA FMEA/CILREVIEWMEETING NOTES.
[ ]
[ ]






NASA FMEA # : 0204-4
NASA DATA:
_ELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SU_YSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 3092






HDW/_c A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ NA] C NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from N_A)
[ 2 /2 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DET._TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ___n=QrlmE [ ] _
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE WILL CAUSE ENGINE SHUT_WN AND _SS OF MISSION.
























NEW [ X ]
MPS
3092







HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )





REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING
NOTES.
i







ASSESSMENT ID: _ _S-3110










ENGINE HELIUM PRESSURE REGULATOR (PRI, 7 ;2,8 ;3,9 )
M. L. MCNEELY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /iR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




SECOND FAILURE WI_usE ENGINE SHUTDOWN AND LOSS OF MISSION.
NSTS 22206 2.3.3L REQUIRES ASSIGNMENT OF 3/IR.

































MPS-3110A BASELINE [ ]
0205-3 NEW [ X ]
MPS
3110
ENGINE HELIUM PRESSURE REGULATOR (PRI,7;2,8;3,9)
M. L. MCNEELY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE )




SECOND FAILURE WILL CAUSE ENGINE SHUTDOWN AND LOSS OF MISSION.
NSTS 22206 2.3.3L REQUIRES ASSIGNMENT OF 3/IR.











NASA FMEA #: 0205-2
NASA DATA- _
B_SESINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




HELIUM ESCAPING THROUGH THE RELIEF VALVE CAN 0VERPRESSURIZE THE _
A_-_C0_,_, ........






































NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MPS
3112
ENGINE HELIUM PRESSURE REGULATOR (PRI, 7 ;2,8 ;3,9 )
M.L.MCNEELY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
w
u
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )



































HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[P] IF] [P]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[x] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /i ] C NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
POSSIBLE OVERPRESSURIZATION (i/I).
CAUSED BY LOSS OF HELIUM (2/2).


































NASA FMEA #: 0206-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]














NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)















NASA FMEA #: 0206-1
NASA DATA:






ENGINE HE RELIEF VALVE PANEL A;B
:_ = =- i




HDW/_C A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ P] [ F] [ P] IX] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] ......
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






































NASA FMEA #: 0206-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







ENGINE HE RELIEF VALVE PANEL A;B




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




POSSIBLE OVERPRESSURIZATION UPON SECOND FAILURE.












NASA FMEA #: 0206-4









ENGINE HE RELIEF VALVE PANEL A;B
LEAD ANALYST: M.L.MCNEELY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) .............
ADEQUATE [ ]
_: _ ___ ....... INADEQUATE [ ]
POSSIBLE OVERPRESSURIZATION.
REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING
NOTES.
mR



























NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




























HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IX] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT. THE CHECK VALVE CANNOT PROTECT AGAINST AN
UPSTREAM LEAK.

































ENGINE REG OUTLET CHECK VLV (CV5,29;6,40;7,45)





NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[p] [P] [P]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)





REF: RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING NOTES.
[ ]
[ ]







NASA FMEA #: 0260-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
INTERCONNECT IN VALVE _Y NEED TO BE OPENED DURING ASCENT DUE TO
A FAILURE IN AN ENGINE HELIUM SYSTEM. FAILURE WILL CAUSE AN
ENGINE TO SHUTDOWN DUE TO LACK OF HELIUM PURGE. LOSS OF MISSION.
NSTS 22206 2.3.3L REQUIRES ASSIGNMENT OF 3/IR.

























NASA FMEA #: 0260-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







ENGINE HELIUM SUPPLY INTERCONNECT INLET VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: M.L.MCNEELY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ IN ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] IF] [P]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT. THE VALVE HAS NO REDUNDANCY.
REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING
NOTES.
w

















ENGINE HELIUM SUPPLY INTERCONNECT INLET VALVE
M.L.MCNEELY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ..... ....
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
POSSIBLE OVERPRESSURIZATION. THIS RI/NASA ANALYSIS COULD BE
COMBINED WITH 0260-4.





























NASA FMEA #: 0260-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
















NASA FMEA #: 0262-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
ClL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) _ ;
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
THE RI/NASA ANALYSIS INDICATES 3/1R FOR ABORT. NO SUPPORTING
RATIONALE IS AVAILABLE AND IOA DOES NOT AGREE.










































NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MPS
3161




[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




























HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ X].
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RI/NASA INDICATES I/i FOR ABORT ONLY. POSSIBLE
OVERPRESSURIZATION.



























NASA FMEA #: 0262-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]













NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





REF: RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING NOTES.
C ]
C 3





















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IX] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

































NASA FMEA #: 0261-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 3170






HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[p] [ F] [P] IX] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILURE WILL HAVE NO EFFECT.
REF: RI/NASA OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING
NOTES.







NASA FMEA #: 0261-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MPS _ .....
MDAC ID: 3171






HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] *
[ ]
co1__PARE C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




























NASA FMEA #: 0259-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 3180






CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILURE WILL HAVE NO EFFECT.











NASA FMEA #: 0259-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 3181









NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
CIL
ITEM




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [































NASA FMEA #: 0409-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE IS ADDRESSED ON IOA WORKSHEET 4660 AND 4666.
DUPLICATE ANALYSIS SHOULD BE DELETED.
THIS
w







NASA FMEA #: NA
NASA DATA:
_ELI_E [ ]













NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
C ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ]
[ NA]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]




[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






























NASA FMEA #: 0202-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PNEU VALVE HE SUPPLY CHECK VALVE (CV4)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ ] [ N ] [ N ]COMPARE [ /N ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




SECOND FAILURE (PD8) WILL ALLOW PNEUMATIC HELIUM TO LEAK AWAY.
PNEUMATIC ACCUMULATORS WILL RETAIN PRESSURE TO CLOSE PREVALVES.
THE CORSSOVER VALVE WILL PROVIDE HELIUM FOR SUBSEQUENT VALVE
OPERATIONS. FAILURE OF ANOTHER HELIUM SUPPLY CHECK VALVE
WILL DEPLETE ENGINE HELIUM SUPPLIES AND VALVE OPERATIONS WILL BE
IMPOSSIBLE. RELIEF SYSTEM WILL PROTECT AGAINST MANIFOLD RUPTURE,
BUT VENTING HYDROGEN IS A FIRE HAZARD DURING ENTRY/LANDING.




























HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






























NASA FMEA #: 0241-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PNEU VALVE HE REG OUTLET CHECK VALVE (CV8)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DE_TE)




HELIUM TANK PRESSURE DISPLAY SUPPORTS PASSAGE OF SCREEN B. FOUR
FAILURES (CV8, cvg, CV4, PD8) WILL CAUSE LOSS OF PNEUMATIC HELIUM
AND INABILITY TO CLOSE PREVALVES.
REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING
NOTES.






NASA FMEA #: 0241-1
NASA DATA:
_ELINE [ ]






PNEU VALVE HE ISOLATION CHECK VALVE (CV8)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C ....
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




SECOND FAILURE (LVl0) WILL PREVENT VALVE OPERATIONS FOR DUMP.
VENTING HYDROGEN WILL CREATE A FI_ _ZARD DURING ENTRY/_LANDING.
REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING



































NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MPS
4021
PNEU VALVE HE ISOLATION CHECK VALVE (CV8)
A.J.MARINO
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

















NASA FMEA #: 0209-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PNEU VALVE HE ISOLATION CHECK VALVE (CV9)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/nmc A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AC_LATORS WILL SUPPLY HELIUM PRESSURE FOR MECO. MAY NOT BE
ABLE TO OPEN PREVALVES FOR DUMP. FiLL AND DRAIN VALVES ARE ON
OTHER HELIUM PREVALVES FOR DUMP. FILL AND DRAIN VALVES ARE ON
OTHER HELIUM LEG_ SO W!L_B_OPERATIQNAL. INEFFICIENT DUMP
DuE TO PREVALVE INOPERABILITY, BUT RELIEF SYSTEM AND i_TING
WILL PROTECT AGAINST MANIFOLD RUPTURE. NO REDUNDANCY.




































NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
CONPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
MPS-4030A BASELINE [ ]
0209-3 NEW [ X ]
MPS
4030
PNEU VALVE HE ISOLATION CHECK VALVE (cvg)
A. J. MARINO
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
















NASA FMEA #: 0209-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DE_TE)




FAILURE OF _8 _D RV_ TO RE_IN ¢LO SED IN ADDIT!QN TO cv9_ ......
FA_ W_ _AL_w ___- Pm_SS_ _%_ _............




























NASA FMEA #: 0631-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IX]*
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
mml
!
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LINE RUPTURE IS NOT VALID AS A LOSS OF REDUNDANCY.

























HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
















































HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING NOTES.
C ]
C ]







NASA FMEA #: 0603-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P]







RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) _nE_UATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LINE RUPTURE IS NOT VALID AS A LOSS OF REDUNDANCY.
z































NASA FMEA #: 0603-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]













HDW/FUNC A B C
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]





COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
u
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)













ASSESS_NT Ib: - MPS-4051
NASA FMEA #: 0603-1
NASA DATA- _ _
_ELI_ [ ] ....




_S _ _ ....
4051







HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




HELIUM PRESSURE IS NOT REQUIRED FOR DUMP. RELIEF SYSTEM AND













































MPS-4060 BASELINE [ ]
NA NEW [ X ]
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MPS
4060




[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






















NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE[ ]
0605-3 NEW [ X ]
MPS
4060




[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)























NASA FMEA #: 0605-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
























LH2 RECIRC MANIF REPRESS CHECK VALVE (CV14)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
co_ [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LINE RUPTURE IS NOT VALID AS LOSS OF REDUNDANCY.










































NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






























HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA]
[P] [x]*
[ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
RELIEF VALVE RV7 IS NOT REDUNDANT TO THE CHECK VALVE. FAILURE
HAS NO EFFECT.


























NASA FMEA #: 0630-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[x]*
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LINE RUPTURE IS NOT VALID AS A LOSS OF REDUNDANCY. FAILURE HAS
NO EFFECT.
REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL&a4248HREEEEWNG
NOTES.






















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
















































NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
MPS-4081 BASELINE [ ]
0630-1 NEW [ X ]
MPS
4081
LH2 FEED MANIF NOM REPRESS CHECK VALVE (CV15)
A.J.MARINO
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DEGRADED DUMP. MPS INERTING WILL CLEAR REMAINING LH2. RELIEF
SYSTEM WILL PROTECT AGAINST MANIFOLD RUPTURE. NO REDUNDANCY.
REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING
NOTES.
w














L02 TANK PRE-PRESS CHECK VALVE (CVI6)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)














































NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
NASA DATA:
MPS-4091 BASELINE [ ]
NA NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MPS
4091




[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
































NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











































NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MPS
4101




[ ] [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




THIS ITEM IS ANALYZED ON IOA 2181-2183 AND RI/NASA 0502.
DUPLICATE ANALYSIS.
DELETE





















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3
C ] C ] C ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
%:.




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




































NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
NASA DATA:
MPS-4110A BASELINE [ ]
0605-3 NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ]
MPS
4110




[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




REF: RI/NASA FMEA/CILREVIEWMEETING NOTES.
[ ]
[ ]
















GH2 PRESS MANIFOLD REPRESS CHECK VALVE (CV24)
A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A = B _ C _.,_,._:_ ,_
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) =_= .........
....................... _bE_U_Z _ _ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:



































NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
MPS-4120 BASELINE [ ]
0248-2 NEW [ X ]
MPS
4120
LH2 FEED MANIF RTLS REPRESS CHECK VALVE (CV30)
A.J.MARINO
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LINE RUPTURE IS NOT VALID AS LOSS OF REDUNDANCY. FAILURE HAS NO
EFFECT.














NASA FMEA #: 0248-1
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 4121
ITEM: LH2 FEED MANIF RTLS REPRESS CHECK VALVE (CV30)









NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable ) --_;_ _,
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
THE VALVE IS ONLY REQUIRED TO OPEN D_NG AN RTLS ABORT. -_CK OF
H_ELI_ REPASS _WILL A_W _NT_NG OF RE--SIDUAT. H2 AFTER LANDING TO
CREATE A FIRE HAZARD. NOMINAL NA, ABORT i/I.

























NASA FMEA #: 0238-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PNEU VALVE HE SUPPLY-ISOLATION VALVE (LV7,LV8)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA]
IF] [P] IX]*
[ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




ACCUMULATORS WILL RETAIN PRESSURE TO OPERATE PREVALVES AT MECO.
SUBSEQUENT VALVE OPERATION MAY BE IMPOSSIBLE. RELIEF SYSTEMS
WILL PREVENT MANIFOLD RUPTURE. VENTING HYDROGEN DURING ENTRY AND
LANDING WILL CREATE A FIRE HAZARD. RI/NASA USE OF
RELIEF SYSTEM AS REDUNDANCY IS INVALID.
REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING
NOTES.












NEW [ X ]
MPS
4131





HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ HA] [ NA]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ......
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]














WILL PREVENT MANIFOLD RUPTURE. VENTING HYDROGEN DURING ENTRY AND




























NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MPS
4132




[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
























PNEU HE CROSSOVER SOLENOID (LVl0)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
[P] IF] [P] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




L0-SS OF ALL REDUNDANCY (LVi0, 7. 8) WILL pRE_LUDE_LVE OPERATION
FOR DUMP. RELIEF SYSTEMS WILL PREVENT MANIFOLD RUPTURE, BUT
VENTING OF H2 DURING ENTRY/LANDING MAY CREATE A FIRE/EXPLOSION
HAZARD.






























NASA FMEA #: 0208-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 13 ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


























PNEU HE CROSSOVER SOLENOID (LV10)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IDA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




Loss OF ALL REDUNDANCY_ (LVl0, 7_' 8) W_LL= _V_ OPE_RATION
FOLLOWING MECO IMPOSSIBLE. RELIEF SYSTEMS WILL PREVENT MANIFOLD








































PNEU HE CROSSOVER SOLENOID (LVI0)
LEAD ANALYST: A. J. MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




HELIUM LEAK AND ENGINE SHUTDOWN ARE NOT VALID FAILURES TO BE
CONSIDERED LOSS OF REDUNDANCY.
REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING
NOTES.
w



















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
NSTS 22206 2.3.2d PRECLUDES THE INCLUSION OF SSME HPOT SEALS OR
RIV IN THE SUCCESSION OF FAILURES. AS SUCH, RELIEF WILL BE
PROVIDED FOR THE 12" FEED LINE. STILL 3/IR FOR LO2 INERT. i ii



























NASA FMEA #: 0225-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






L02 PREVALVE OPENING SOLENOID (LVI2,LVI4,LVI6)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA]
[ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 12-14-
87.
w





NASA FMEA #: 0225-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]--











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ Y ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



























NASA FMEA #: 0225-5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LO2 PREVALVE OPENING SOLENOID (LVI2,LVI4,LVI6)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




FAILURE OF BOTH OPENING SOLENOIDS CAN PREVENT PREVALVE CLOSURE
DESPITE PROPER OPERATION OF CLOSING SOLENOIDS.
REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 12-14-
87.




















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)







































NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MPS
4160
LO2 PREVALVE OPENING SOLENOID (LVI3,LVI5,LVI7)
A. J. MARINO
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[p] IF] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )


















NASA FMEA #: 0290-2
NASA DATA: _ ;











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA C 1 /i ] C NA] [ NA] C NA]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)





























NASA FMEA #: 0226-5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )






























HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /iR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[P] [P] [P] [
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NST_ 22206 2._).2d PRECLUDES THE iN_!ON OF SSME HPOT SEALS OR
RIV IN THE SUCCESSION OF FAILURES. THEY REMAIN VALID RELIEF
PATHS. STILL 3/IR FOR LO2 INERT.






























NASA FMEA #: 0226-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




SECOND FAILURE CAN CLOSE PREVALVE.












NASA FMEA #: 0227-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 4164





HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]




FAILURE IS NOT DETECTABLE.









































MPS-4165 BASELINE [ ]
0227-4 NEW [ X ]
MPS
4165
LH2 PREVALVE OPENING SOLENOID (LVI8,LV20,LV22)
A.J.MARINO
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





























HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (I f different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILURES IN INTERFACING SUBSYSTEMS ARE NOT ALLOWED (NSTS 22206,
_l_._d), _ S_0_FAILORE WILL _NT-_LOSURE AT MECO, BUT HAS NO
HARMFUL EFFECT.

































NEW [ X ]
MPS
4166
LH2 PREVALVE OPENING SOLENOID (LVI8,LV20,LV22)
A.J.MARINO
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILURE TO CLOSE PREVALVE HAS NO EFFECT. POSTULATING FAILURES IN
INTERFACING SUBSYSTEMS IS NOT PART OF THIS ANALYSIS (NSTS 22206,
2.3.2d).























HDW/_C A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ X] *
[ X]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILURE TO CLOSE P REVALVE HAS NOT EFFE_. SUBSEQUEN[f IFAILURES IN































NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
MPS-4167A BASELINE [ ]
o29o-1 NEW [ X ]
MPS
4167
LH2 PREVALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LVI9, LV21, LV23)
A.J.MARINO
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 12-14-
87.
l











NEW [ X ]
LH2 PREVALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV19,LV21,LV23)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)















































HDW/FUNC A B C
ClL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
u
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE )




FAILURE OF PREVALVE TO REMAIN CLOSED HAS NO EFFECT. FAILURES IN
INTERFACING SUBSYSTEMS ARE NOT CONSIDERED (NSTS 22206, 2.3.2d).
REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 12-14-
87.





















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



































NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
MPS-4169A BASELINE [ ]
0228-4 NEW [ X ]
MPS
4169
LH2 PREVALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LVI9,LV21,LV23)
A. J. MARINO
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] [F] [P]
[ NA] [ NA] [ HA]







RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)













NASA FME #: 0231-1
NASA DATA:
-BASELINE [ ]







L02 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE CLOSING
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] _ [ NA] [ NA] " [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If:_appiicable) ......
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS : ......... _ _......































NASA FMEA #: 0290-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LO2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE CLOSING
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 12-14-
87.
w






















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) _ •
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS: .... _ ........






































NASA FMEA #: 0231-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]














HDW/FUNC A B C
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]





COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )































NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
[P] [P] [P] [X]
COMPARE [ N / 3 [ ] [N] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS :
[ 3/1R]
(If different from NASA)
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS DETECTABLE VIA MANIFOLD PRESSURE
INDICATORS.




































NASA FMEA #: 0231-5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]














HDW/FUNC A B C
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]





COMPARE [ N I ] [ ] [ N ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS DETECTABLE VIA MANIFOLD PRESSURE
INDICATORS.




















LH2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE CLOSING
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C -
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
INADEQUATE
REM_: • _ -_
REF: RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING NOTES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

















































NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMP_ [ N /N ]
N_A DATA:
MPS-4180A B_ELINE [ ]
o29o-1 NEW [ X ]
ms
4180




[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]






_CO_NDATIONS: (If different from N_A)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [









RI/N_A CIL OF 12-23-87 _D RI/NASA CIL WO_HEET OF 8-18-






NASA FMEA #: 0290-2
NASA DATA:
BK_EL_NE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 4180






HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X]
[X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) _e : _+ o
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]




































NASA FMEA #: 0232-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
































HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) .....
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

































NASA FMEA #: 0232-5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]













HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[X]*
[x]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ i /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SINGLE FAILURE MAY RESULT IN MANIFOLD RUPTURE.
REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87.
[ ]
C ]






















NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[ NA] [ NA]
IF] [P]
[ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ NA] [ X ] *
[p] [x]
[ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ADEQ "_v_-_ [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
























NASA FMEA #: 0233-5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
i
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




INBOARD VALVE (LV26) IS CRITICALITY 1/1. OUTBOARD VALVE IS 2/1R.
REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING
NOTES.













MPS _c _ _ _
4191





HDW/FUNC A B C
ClL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ p ] [ F ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)















































HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
























NASA [ 3 /IR ]











[P] [P] [P] IX!*
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE _ [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]




































NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MPS
4201
LO2 OUTBOARD FILL VALVE OPENING SOLENOID (LV28)
A.J.MARINO
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ HA] [ NA] [ NA]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)













NASA FMEA #: 0221-2
NASA DATA:
_ET.I_ [ ]
















NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /iR ]
[ NA]
[ P ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
[ F-] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS. " (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
















































MPS-4202A BASELINE [ ]
0221-5 NEW [ X ]
MPS
4202
LO2 OUTBOARD FILL VALVE OPENING SOLENOID (LV28)
A.J.MARINO
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 12-15-
87.
w





NASA FMEA #: 0222-1
NASA DATA: _ _
BASELINE [ ]










HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




THE RI/NASA ANALYSIS INDICATES I/i FOR ABORT !OA CONCURS.

























NASA FMEA #: 0222-5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[p] IF] [P] [X]*
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
w
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)













ASSESSMENT _ DATE: 2/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-4212














HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ N A] [ NA] _[ ]







RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [- ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
































NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
MPS-4212A BASELINE [ ]
0222-4 NEW [ X ]
MPS
4212
LO2 OUTBOARD FILL VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV29)
A.J.MARINO
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] [F] [P]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]







RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 12-15-
87.
w






NASA FMEA #: 0223-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LO2 INBOARD FILL VALVE OPENING SOLENOID (LV30)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) .....
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [





























NASA FMEA #: 0223-5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LO2 INBOARD FILL VALVE OPENING SOLENOID (LV30)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]








RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE )




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 12-15-
87.
=






NASA FMEA #: 0223-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



































NASA FMEA #: 0223-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 12-15-
87.






NASA FMEA #: 0224-1
NASA DATA: - __i
BASELI_ [ ]




PS _ _ :
4223





HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COM?ARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





































NASA FMEA #: 0224-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
[P] IF] [P] [X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 12-15-
87.
















LO2 INBOARD FILL VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV31)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C .......
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
































NASA FMEA #: 0224-5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LO2 INBOARD FILL VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV31)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
_ITI_LITY _D_DANCY SC_ENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P] [F] [P]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 12-15-
87.
n












NEW [ X ]
MPS
4226










HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



























NASA FMEA #: 0270-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LH2 OUTBOARD FILL VALVE OPENING SOLENOID (LV32)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ HA] [ NA]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 12-15-
87.
w














MPS _ ...... _== ....._
4228





HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
[P] [F] [P] [X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE RI/NASA ANALYSIS INDICATES i/I FOR ABORT. IOA CONCURS. THE
IOA CRITICALITY WAS DRIVEN BY THE FAILURE TO REMAIN CLOSED.








































NEW [ X ]
MPS
4228
LH2 OUTBOARD FILL VALVE OPENING SOLENOID (LV32)
A.J.MARINO
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




THREE FAILURES MUST OCCUR BEFORE LH2 CAN ESCAPE.
REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 12-15-
87.






NASA FMEA #: 0271-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C_
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RI/NASA INDICATES 1/1 FOR ABORT. IOA CONCURS.








































HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[P] IF] [P] IX] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
w
W
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

























LH2 OUTBOARD FILL VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV33)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDw/FUNC A B C _i .....
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[P] [P] [P] IX].
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











































NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
MPS-4231A BASELINE [ ]
0271-5 NEW [ X ]
MPS
4231
LH2 OUTBOARD FILL VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV33)
A.J.MARINO
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ HA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)














NASA FMEA #: 0272-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







1/42 INBOARD FILL VALVE OPENING SOLENOID (LV34)
A. J. MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPA_ [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)







































NASA FMEA #: 0272-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LH2 INBOARD FILL VALVE OPENING SOLENOID (LV34)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 12"15-
87.
!














LH2 INBOARD FILL VALVE OPENING SOLENOID (LV34)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT :
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT • ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C .....
NASA
IOA
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
[ /
(If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






































NASA FMEA #: 0272-5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)















NASA FMEA #: 0273-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ i
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 4235





HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






























NASA FMEA #: 0273-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]













HDW/FUNC A B C
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]





COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 12-15-
87.





NASA FM_A #: .......0291-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 4236





HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [. ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 12-9-
87.






NASA FMEA #: 0291-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 12-9-
87.





















HDW/FUNC A B C ....
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)































NASA FMEA #: 0273-5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LH2 INBOARD FILL VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV35)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 12-15-
87.





NASA FMEA #: 0229-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












































NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPA_Z [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MPS
4241




[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIE_MEETING NOTES,
[ ]
[ ]






NASA FMEA #: 0229-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LH2 RECIRC PUMP VALVE OPENING SOLENOID (LV36)
LEAD ANALYST: A. J. MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE WILL BE i/i D_ING A_RT ONLY.























NASA FMEA #: 0229-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LH2 RECIRC PUMP VALVE OPENING SOLENOID (LV36)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILURE WILL BE I/i DURING AN ABORT ONLY.
REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 8-18-
87.
i





















_ HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] .... [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ F ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




FAILURE CAN PREVENT LH2 DUMP. SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF RELIEF
SYSTEM CAN CAUSE MANIFOLD RUPTURE.






































HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[x]*
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 8-18-
87.






NASA FMEA #: 0230-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/nmc A S C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
































NASA FMEA #: 0230-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 8-18-
87.
u
























HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (if different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DUMP _D RELIEF sYsT_SARE NOT _REDUNDANT TO THE REPRESS SYSTEM.
FAILURE RESULTS IN DEGRADED DUMP. NO LOSS OF CREW OR VEHICLE.
































NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
MPS-4260A BASELINE [ ]
0601-4 NEW [ X ]
MPS
4260
LO2 MANIFOLD REPRESS VALVE (LV40,LV41)
A.J.MARINO
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




INBOARD VALVE (LV40) IS 1/1. OUTBOARD VALVE (LV41) IS 2/1R.
REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING
NOTES.






NASA FMEA #: 0601-1
_N_A DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DUMP AND RELIEF SYSTEMS ARE NOT REDUNDANT TO THE REPRESS SYSTEM.
FAI__suLTS IN DEGRADEDDUMP. : NO_SSOF C_OR_HICLE.



























NASA FMEA #: 0601-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]





















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING
NOTES.



















HDW/_C A _ B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
[P] [P] [P] [
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





































NASA FMEA #: 0606-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LH2 MANIFOLD REPRESS VALVE (LV42,LV43)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DUMP AND RELIEF SYSTEMS ARE NOT REDUNDANT TO THE REPRESS SYSTEM.
FAILURE RESULTS IN DEGRADED DUMP. NO LOSS OF CREW OR VEHICLE.
REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING
NOTES.
w
























NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (if different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





































NASA FMEA #: 0606-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REGULATOR (PR6) WILL KEEP HELIUM FLOW AT LOW LEVEL.

















LH2 MANIFOLD REPRESS VALVE (LV42,LV43)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT .........ITEM




[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [
[ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)














































-NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)































HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

































NASA FMEA #: 0290-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








LO2 FEED DISCONNECT VALVE OPENING SOLENOID
A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 1 /1 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 12-14-
87.
w


















L02 FEED DISCONNECT VALVE OPENING SOLENOID
LEAD ANALYST: A. J. MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
[P] IF] [P] IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS" (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






























NASA FMEA #: 0219-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[X]*
[ ]
COMPARE C N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE VALVE HAS A MECHANICAL BACKUP CLOSURE DEVICE.
REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87.
[ ]
[ ]






NASA FMEA #: 0219-5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
















NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE





























NASA FMEA #: 0220-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







L02 FEED DISCONNECT VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]coMp_ [ N /N ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 12-11-
87.





















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
IT_.M
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[x].
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


































NASA FMEA #: 0220-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

























LO2 FEED DISCONNECT VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID
LEAD ANALYST: A. J .MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[P] IF] [P] IX] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]








































NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NPS
4300




[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [



























LH2 FEED DISCONNECT VALVE OPENING SOLENOID
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) .....
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
IOA DID NOT ACCOUNT FOR THE LATCH.






















































HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
[P] IF] [P] IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)














NASA FMEA #: 0290-2
NASA DATA:
BASELI_ [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]




COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different fromNASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)









































NASA FMEA #: 0217-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LH2 FEED DISCONNECT VALVE OPENING SOLENOID
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/nmC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE VALVE HAS AMECHANICAL BACKUP SYSTEM TO CLOSE IT AT ET
SEPARATION.
REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87.





















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE








































ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-43 I0
NASA FMEA #: 0218-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








LH2 FEED DISCONNECT VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID
A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P] [F] [P]
[ NA] [ NA] [ HA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 12-11-
87.






NASA FMEA #: 0218-5
NASA DATA:
_ELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
_ C!L
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]





COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] IN] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




































NASA FMEA #: 0218-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]














NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)































HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ 3 [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






















NASA FMEA #: 0215-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LH2 RECIRC DISCONNECT VALVE OPENING SOLENOID





NASA [ 3 13 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

































HDW/FUNC A B C
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




TWO FAILURES ARE REQUIRED BEFORE THE DISCONNECT VALVE WILL CLOSE.
ANOTHER FAILURE IS REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF CREW OR VEHICLE.
SEE RI/NASA 0405-2.










































NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ I ]
MPS
4322
LH2 RECIRC DISCONNECT VALVE OPENING SOLENOID
A.J.MARINO
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)




MECHANICAL BACKUP DEVICE EXISTS FOR CLOSURE AT MECO.
REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF ii-i0-
87.






NASA FMEA #: 0216-1
NASA DATA: _y
BASELINE [ ]














HDW/FUNC A B C
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
NASA [ X ] *
IOA [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DE_TE)




THE DISCONNECT VALVE HAS A BACKUP MECHANICAL CLOSURE DEVICE.














































LH2 RECIRC DISCONNECT VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF ii-I0-
87.
m






NASA FMEA #: 0290-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REF:
87.














































NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )











































[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]






(If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)








































NASA FMEA #: 0216-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LH2 RECIRC DISCONNECT VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




TWO FAILURES ARE REQUIRED BEFORE THE DISCONNECT VALVE WILL CLOSE.
ANOTHER FAILURE IS REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF CREW OR VEHICLE.
SEE RI/NASA 0405-2.
REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87.
w
i





NASA FMEA #: 0245-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ................
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
RI/NASA DOES NOT SHOW A i/I CRITICALITY FOR ABORT.











































LH2 FEED RTLS INBOARD DUMP VALVE OPENING
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
























NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
MPS-4340B BASELINE [ ]
0290-2 NEW [ X ]
MPS
4340




[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable):
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]









































NASA FMEA #: 0245-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LH2 FEED RTLS INBOARD DUMP VALVE OPENING
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




THE RI/NASA ANALYSIS DOES NOT SHOW A 1/1 CRITICALITY FOR ABORT.
REF: RI/NASA FMEA/CILREVIEWMEETING NOTES.
i
i-



























NASA [ 2 /iR ] [ P ] [ F ]





COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


















































NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA FMEA/CILREVIEW MEETING NOTES.
[ ]
C ]



















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
_- _ ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]_
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




RI/NASA SHOULD INDICATE 1/1 FOR ABORT.
























NASA FMEA #: 0290-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LH2 FEED RTLS OUTBOARD DUMP VALVE OPENING
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 12-14-
87.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
I0A [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]_
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) i__ ___ _ _ _ _ _
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]









































HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RI/NASA SHOULD INDICATE i/I FOR ABORT.


























NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA C 2 /IR ] [ P ]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )





































NASA FMEA #: 0245-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]













HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[X]*
IX]
COMPARE [ I ] C ] C N ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
























LH2 FEED MANIFOLD RTLS PRESS VALVE (LV74 ,LV75)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/_C A B C +-+
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)























































NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




THIS FAILURE IS i/i FOR RTLS ABORT AND NA FOR NOMINAL.
w




















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
































NASA FMEA #: 0244-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]













NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[P] [P] [P]








(If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 8-18-
87.
u















L02 OVERBOARD BLEED VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID





CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
[ N/N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)








































NASA FMEA #: 0290-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
[P] [P] [P] IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 8-18-
87.
w
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 C-I063
APPENDIX C














LO2 OVERBOARD BLEED VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] _
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ 3 [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )









































NASA FMEA #: 0244-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LO2 OVERBOARD BLEED VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID
LEAD ANALYST: A. J. MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COHPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA FMEA #: 0244-5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]













REDUNDANCY SCREENS _ : CIL
ITEM
A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] - [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
RI/NASA INDICATES 1/1 CRITICALITY FOR A PRELAUNCH ABORT. IOA
CONCURS.

































NASA FMEA #: 0243-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LO2 POGO ACCUM RECIRC VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RI/NASA REPORTS A i/i CRITICALITY FOR PRELAUNCH ABORTS. IOA
CONCURS.
i






NASA FMEA #: 0243-5
NASA DATA:
BAS_LX_E [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


































NASA FMEA #: 0243-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]













NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[p] [F] [P]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

























LO2 POGO ACCUM RECIRC VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/_C A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




































NASA FMEA #: 0250-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ I ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING NOTES.
[ ]
[ ]







NASA FMEA #: 0250-5
NASA DATA:
_EL_NE [ ....]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COHPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












































LH2 HI POINT BLEED VALVE OPENING SOLENOID (LV79)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 10-14-
87.















LH2 HI POINT BLEED VALVE OPENING SOLENOID (LV79)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



































NASA FMEA #: 0226-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LO2 PREVALVE REDUNDANT CLOSING SOLENOID
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


























L02 PREVALVE REDUNDANT CLOSING SOLENOID
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
[P] IF] [P] IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)













































LO2 PREVALVE REDUNDANT CLOSING SOLENOID
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)















NASA FMEA #: 0226-5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]














NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUN_DANC¥ SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ F ]
[ P ] [ F ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




































NASA FMEA #: 0226-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




(LVS0, LV81, LV82 )
MPS
4402
LO2 PREVALVE REDUNDANT CLOSING SOLENOID






HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NSTS 22206 2.3.2d PRECLUDES THE INCLUSION OF HPOT SEALS OR SSME
RIV IN THE FAILURE SERIES. CRITICALITY 3/IR FOR DUMP IS VALID.
REF: RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 11-20-87.







NASA FMEA #: 0226-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 4402
ITEM: ....LO2 PREVALVE REDUND_ CLOSING SOLENOID
(LV80,LV81,LV82) ....
LEAD ANALYST: A. J. MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) _........... _ ,
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS : _i_ =_½



































LO2 PREVALVE REDUNDANT OPENING SOLENOID
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NSTS 22206 2.3.2d PRECLUDES THE INCLUSION OF HPOT SEALS OR SSME
RIV IN FAILURE SERIES. CRITICALITY 3/IR FOR DUMP IS VALID.
REF: RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 12-14-87.
















CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[P] IF] [P] IX]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )







































NEW [ X ]
MPS
4412







HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 12-14-
87.
w






NASA FMEA #: 0225-5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MPS _
MDAC ID: 4412






HDW/_C A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] C ] C ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ...._ _............
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
FAILURE OF BOTH OPENING SOLENOIDS-C_ PREVENT PREVALVE CLOSURE AT
MECO, REGARDLESS OF THE OPERATION OF THE CLOSING SOLENOIDS.



































LO2 TANK GND PRE-PRESS (ORB/GND) DISC. (ORB
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




THE DISCONNECT WAS PREVIOUSLY ANALYZED UNDER IOA 1061-1064 AND
RI/NASA 0517. THIS IOA ANALYSIS SHOULD BE DELETED.
m













ITEM: LO2 TANK GND PRE-PRESS (ORB/GND) DISC. (ORB




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) .......
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
WE DISCO_ECT WAS P_IOUSLY ANALYZED UNDER IOA 1061-1064 _D























NASA FMEA # : NA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LO2 TANK GND PRE-PRESS (ORB/GND) DISC. (ORB
LEAD ANALYST: A. J. MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE DISCONNECT WAS PREVIOUSLY ANALYZED UNDER IOA 1061-1064 AND
RI/NASA 0517. THIS IOA ANALYSIS SHOULD BE DELETED.
u
m


























[ / ] [ ]
[ 2/IR] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ] *
[P] [P] IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE DISCONNECT WAS PREVIOUSLY ANALYZED UNDER IOA 2221 AND 2222,































NASA FMEA #: NA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LH2 TANK GND PRE-PRESS (ORB/GND) DISC. (ORB
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] C ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE DISCONNECT WAS PREVIOUSLY ANALYZED UNDER IOA 2221 AND 2222,
AND RI/NASA 0501. THIS IOA ANALYSIS SHOULD BE DELETED.

















LH2 TANK GND PRE-PRESS (ORB/GND) DISC. (ORB
LEAD ANALYST: A. J. MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE DISCONNECT WAS P_IOUSLY ANALYZED __IOA 2221 AND 2222,


























NASA FMEA #: NA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TEST PORT, PNEU HE OUTLET (TP1)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]







RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE IS COVERED UNDER LEAKAGE OF THE LINE ON IOA ANALYSIS
4630 AND RI/NASA 0236. THIS IOA ANALYSIS SHOULD BE DELETED.
w





NASA FMEA # : NA
NASA DAT_A:












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
.... ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE IS COVERED UNDER LEAKAGE OF THE LINE ON IOA ......_

































NASA FMEA #: NA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
C ] *
C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE IS COVERED UNDER LEAKAGE OF THE LINE ON IOA











NASA FMEA #: NA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]



















[ / ] [ ]
[ 2/1R] [P]
[N/N ] IN]




RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS _iLURE i_i COVERED _DER _AKAGE OF T_ LINE ON !OA _






























NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
MPS-4500 BASELINE [ ]
NA NEW [ X ]
MPS
4500
TEST PORT, LH2 PREPRESS DISC. CHECK VALVE (TP10)
A. J. MARINO
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE IS COVERED UNDER LEAKAGE OF THE LINE ON IOA










NASA FMEA #: NA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] *
IX]:
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




THIS FAILURE IS CQVE_DUNDER LEAKAGEQFTHE LINE ON IOAANALYSIS



























NASA FMEA #: NA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE IS COVERED UNDER LEAKAGE OF THE LINE ON IOA ANALYSIS
4640 AND RI/NASA 0634. THIS IOA ANALYSIS SHOULD BE DELETED.
w
w







NASA FMEA #: 0239-1













HDW/_C A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /iR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




SECOND FAILURE (LVI0) WILLI_P_NT VALVE FOR__I_:I :
_LIEF SYST_S_W-_LL PROT_CT_;AGA_ _IFO_ _RU__ _NTING
HYDROGEN WILL CREATE A FIRE HAZARD DURING ENTRY/LANDING.



































NASA FMEA #: 0239-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /1 ]
IOA [ 2 IIR ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
[p] [P] [P] IX]
COMPARE [ N IN ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING
NOTES.
=






NASA FMEA #: 0239-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







PNEU VALVE HE SUPPLY REGULATOR (PR4)
A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RELIEF VALVE WILL DUMP HELIUM INTO AFT COMPARTMENT.



































NEW [ X ]
MPS
4540




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REPRESSURIZATION IS NOT ESSENTIAL FOR MPS DUMP. DEGRADED DUMP.
RELIEF SYSTEMS WILL PROTECT AG_ATNST MANIFOLD RUPTURE.
REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING
NOTES.




















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[x] *
[X]







RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LO2 LEAKAGE FROM SENSE LINE THROUGH REGULATOR.


























LO2 MANIF REPRESS REGULATOR (PRS)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
z
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REPRESS VALVES ARE OPEN FOR 90 SEC DURING DUMP. HAZARD DURING
ENTRY REPRESS ONLY.





















LH2 MANIF REPRESS REGULATOR (PR6)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/_C A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPRESSURIZATIO_ IS NOT ESSE_!AL FOR MPS DUMP. DEGRADED DUMP;_


















































HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
[P] [F] [P] [X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




LH2_GE FROM SENSE LINE THROUGH REGULATOR.
REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING
NOTES.



















NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]




[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPRESS VALVES ARE OPEN FOR 88 SEC DURING DUMP, _Z_D DURING
ENTRY REPRESS ONLY.































NASA FMEA #: 0251-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PNEU VALVE HE SUPPLY RELIEF VALVE (RV4)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
_ITICALITY _D_DANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P] [NA] [P]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CILREVIEWMEETING
NOTES.
w
















NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MPS
4561




[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]








RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)













































NASA FMEA #: 0251-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PNEU VALVE HE SUPPLY RELIEF VALVE (RV4)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RE?_ _ RI/NASA _A/CILREVIEWMEETING_OTES. .....








NASA FMEA #: 0237-2
NASA DATA: ......
BASELINE [ ]






PNEUVALVE HE SUPPLY TANK (TK4)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ..... ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C _ _ _
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






































NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
MPS-4580 BASELINE [ ]
0210-2 NEW [ X ]
MPS
4580
LO2 PREVALVE PNEU ACCUMULATOR (AUS)
A.J.MARINO
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING
NOTES.
i






NASA FMEA #: 0210-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]




[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
[p] [p] [p] [x]
[N] [N] [N] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )









































NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]










[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



























NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
CIL
ITEM
[P] IF] [ P] IX] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RELIEF SYSTEM IS NOT A REDUNDANT ITEM. VENTING OF HYDROGEN
DURING ENTRY/_DING WILL _ATE A_FIRE_A/_D, ................
REF:
NOTES.
























NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
MPS-4620 BASELINE [ ]
NA NEW [ X ]
MPS
4620
PNEUMATIC HE FILL LINE (. 50", .375", .625" DIA)
A.J.MARINO
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ HA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS ASSESSMENT ADDRESSES THE LINE FROM CHECK VALVE CV4 TO TANK
TK4. POSSIBLE OVERPRESSURIZATION.
w
















NEW [ X ]
MPS
4620
PNEUMATIC HE FILL LINE (.50",.375u,.625 " DIA)
A.J.MARINO
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[p] [F] [P] [X] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS ASSESSMENT ADDRESSES THE LINE FROM THE DISCONNECT (PD8)TO
THE CHECK VALVES (CVI, 2, 3, 4).





































NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MPS
4620
PNEUMATIC HE FILL LINE (. 50", .375", .625" DIA)
A.J.MARINO
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]







RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




THIS ASSESSMENT ADDRESSES THE LINES FROM THE HELIUM TANKS (TKI,
2, 3, 6, 7, 8,9, i0, ii) TO THE _HECKVALVES (CV25, 26, 36, 37,
41, 42).











NASA FMEA #: NA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]-











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] *
[X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
IOA ATTEMPTED TO ANALYZE ALL 0.5 INCH HELIUM LINES UNDER ONE
ANALYSIS WORKSHEET. RI/NASA TREATED THEM INDIVIDUALLY. IOA NOW
BELIEVES THE RI/NASA APPROACH IS THE MORE APPROPRIATE ONE. HALF-
INCH LINES WILL BE TREATED ON SUPPLEMENTAL ASSESSMENT

























NASA FMEA #: 0110-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PNEUMATIC HE PRESSURE LINE (.50" DIA)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE C / ] C ] C ] [ ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS ASSESSMENT IS FOR THE LINE FROM CHECK VALVE CV9 TO ALL
DOWNSTREAM SOLENOID INTERFACES ON THE ACCUMULATOR LEG.
REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING
NOTES.












NEW [ X ]
MPS
4630
PNEUMATIC HE PRESSURE LINE (.50" DIA)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ]. [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) _ : _
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
THIS ASSESSMENT IS FOR THE LINE FROM THE PNE_TIC ISOLATION
VALVES (LV7, 8) TO THE PNE_TIC REGULATOR (PR4_.
























NASA FMEA #: 0114-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PNEUMATIC HE PRESSURE LINE (.50" DIA)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS ASSESSMENT IS FOR THE LINE FROM THE REGULATOR (PR4) TO THE
UPSTREAM CHECK VALVE (CV8).
REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CILREVIEWMEETING
NOTES.
w






NASA FMEA #: 0190-1
NASA DATA; ............
BAS--ELINE [ ]







PNEUMATIC HE PRESSURE LINE (.50" DIA)
A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] E ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / 3 [ ] E ] [ ] E ]
(ADD/DELETE)




_IS ASSES_N_ IS FO_R THE LiNE_ _ROM TH_ RE LIjFoVALVE CLOSEING
SOLENOIDS (LV24, 25) TO THE RELIEF VALVES (PV7, 8).





























NASA FMEA #: 0143-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS ASSESSMENT IS FOR THE LINE CONNECTING THE BLOWDOWN VALVES
(LV26, 27).





















PNEUMATIC HE PRESSURE LINE (.50" DIA)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS ASSESSMENT IS FOR THE LINE FROMTHE DO WNSTRE/hM BLOWDOWN
VALVE (LV27) TO THE PURGE ORIFICE. RI/NASA INDICATES i/I FOR
ABORT. IOA CONCURS. DEGRADED PURGE WILL HAVE NO EFFECT ON
NOMINAL MISS!0_. INEFFECTIVE PURGE DURING RTLS OR TAL CAN CAUSE
_SS_ OF _ICnZ.





































NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MPS
4630
PNEUMATIC HE PRESSURE LINE (.50" DIA)
A. J. MARINO
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] IF] [P]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
[X] *
IX]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS ASSESSMENT IS FOR THE 0.5" LINES FROM THE UPSTREAM PNEUMATIC
CHECK VALVE (CV8) TO ALL DOWNSTREAM SOLENOID INTERFACES ON THE
NON-ACCUMULATOR LEG. A SINGLE FAILURE CAN CAUSE COMPARTMENT
OVERPRESSURIZATION.










NASA FMEA #: 0255-1
NASA_ DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS ASSESSMENT IS FOR THE LINE FROM THE FILTER (FLL) TO THE
PNE_JMATIC IS_TI_VALVES (LVT, 8)'_-_......



























NASA FMEA #: 0635-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
L
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS ASSESSMENT IS FOR THE LINE FROM THE DOWNSTREAM LO2 MANIFOLD
REPRESS VALVE (LV41) TO THE CORRESPONDING REGULATOR (PR5).
THE HAZARD EXISTS DURING PERIODS OF REPRESSURIZATION (DUMP,
ENTRY) ONLY. AT OTHER TIMES IT IS 3/IR.
REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING
NOTES.
r_















PNEUMATIC HE PRESSURE LINE (.50" DIA)
LEAD ANALYST: A. J. MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]








RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS ASSESS_ISFoR THE LINE CONNECTI_ _E LO2 MANIFOLD
REPRESSURIZATION VALVES (LV40, 41). THE HAZARD EXISTS DURING
PERIODS OF REPRESSURIZATION (DUMP, ENTRY) ONLY. AT OTHER TIMES
IT IS 2/IR.






















NASA FMEA #: 0637-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PNEUMATIC HE PRESSURE LINE (.50" DIA)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




THIS ASSESSMENT IS FOR THE LINE FROM THE DOWNSTREAM LH2 MANIFOLD
REPRESS VALVE (LV43) TO THE CORRESPONDING REGULATOR (PR6).
THE HAZARD EXISTS DURING PERIODS OF REPRESSURIZATION (DUMP,
ENTRY) ONLY. AT OTHER TIMES IT IS 3/IR.
REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING
NOTES.
m






NASA FMEA #: 0638-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS ASSESSMENT IS FOR THE LINE CONNECTING THE LH2 MANIFOLD
REPRESSURIZATION VALVES (LV42, 43). THE HAZARD EXISTS DURING
PERIODS OF REPRESSURIZATION (DUMP, ENTRY) ONLY. AT OTHER TIMES
IT IS 2/IR.




















NASA FMEA #: 0236-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







PNEUMATIC HE PRESS VALVE ACTUATION LINE




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ HA] [ NA]
[X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS ASSESSMENT IS FOR THE 0.25 AND 0.38" LINES FROM THE UPSTREAM
PNEUMATIC CHECK VALVE (CV8) TO ALL DOWNSTREAM SOLENOID INTERFACES
ON THE NON-ACCUMULATOR LEG. A SINGLE FAILURE CAN CAUSE
COMPARTMENT OVERPRESSURIZATION.






















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
MPS-4640 BASELINE [ ]
NA NEW [ X ]
MPS
4640




[ ] [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




I0A ATTEMPTED TO ANALYZE_Id_ 0,25 AND 0.38 _HELIUM LINES
UNDER ONE ANALYSIS WORKSHEET. RI/NASA TREATED THEM INDIVIDUALLY.
IOA NOW BELIEVES THE RI/NASA APPROACH=TO BE THE MORE APPROPRIATE
ONE. THESE LINES WILL BE TREATED ON SUPPLEMENTAL _




































PNEUMATIC HE PRESS VALVE ACTUATION LINE
COMPARE [ / ]
A.J.MARINO
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILURE OF THE LINE AND CHECKV ALVE CV30 WILL ALLOW LH2 LEAKAGE
IN_ THE AFT COMPKRTMENT-FOLLOWING THE OPENING OF THE RELIEF
ISOLATION VALVE (PV8) AT MECO. THE FAILURE IS I/I DURING RTLS
ONLY.
REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING
NOTES.
w





ASSES_-NT DATE : 2/16/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-4640B
NASA FMEA #: 0122-1
NASA DATA: ....
BASELINE [ ]





PS =: _ _ _
4640





HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
THIS ASSESSMENT IS FOR THE LINE CONNECTING THE LH2 MANIFOLD RTLS
REPRESSURIZATION VALVES (LV75, 75). TWO FAILURES ARE REQUIRED
FOR A HELIUM LEAK TO OCCUR DURING NOMINAL FLIGHT, AND THREE FOR A
HYDROGEN LEAK. THE FAILURE IS i/i DURING AN RTLS
ABORT ONLY.
































NASA FMEA #: 0190-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








PNEUMATIC HE PRESS VALVE ACTUATION LINE
A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS ASSESSMENT IS FOR SEVERAL HELIUM LINES THAT CONNECT A
SOLENOID VALVE TO A PROPELLANT VALVE IN ORDER TO OPERATE THE
PROPELLANT VALVE. THESE ARE: LV50 TO PD3, LV46 TO PDI, 0V48 TO
PD2, LVI8 TO PV4, LV20 TO PV5, OV22 TO PV6, LVI2 AND LV83 TO PVI,
LVI4 AND LV84 TO PV2, LVI6 AND LV85 TO PV3, LV76 TO PVI9, LV65 TO
THE PDI LATCH AND LV67 TO THE PD2 LATCH. ALL OF THESE LINES ARE
PRESSURIZED DURING ASCENT.
REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING
NOTES.







N_A _ #: 0191-1
N_A DATA:
_ELI_ [ ]








PNEUMATIC HE P_SS VALVE AC_ATION LINE
A.J.MARINO
ASSESSME_:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITI_LITY _D_DANCY S_ENS CIL
FLIG_ IT_
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] C F ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




_COMMENDATIONS: (If different from N_A)
[ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELeTE)




_IS ASSESSMENT IS FOR S_L HELIUM LINES _T CO_ A
SO;._NOID VALVE TO A PROPEL_T VAL_ IN ORDER TO OPE_TE THE
PROPEL_ VALVE. THESE _: LV72 TO _17, LV73 TO PVIS, LVT?
T0 _22, LV5i _3, LV47 TO PDi, LV49 TO_D2, LVI9 TO PV4, _
LV21 TO _5, LV23 TO _6, LV66 TO PDI _TCH AND LV68 TO PD2
_TCH. A_ OF THESE LINES _ _P_SS_IZED (SOT._NOID C_SED)
D_ING _CE_ _ _ _ _
LINE-Ru_ A_ER OPENING THE SOT._NOID CAN CAUSE
OVERP_ZZ_IZATION.
































NASA FMEA #: 0192-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







PNEUMATIC HE PRESS VALVE ACTUATION LINE
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS ASSESSMENT IS FOR HELIUM LINES IN THE LO2 PREVALVE CLOSING
SYSTEM. THEY ARE: LVI3 TO PVI, LVI5 TO PV2, LVI7 TO PV3, LV80
TO LVI3, LV81 TO LVI5 AND LV82 TO LVI7.
REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 12-10-
87.
L







NASA FMEA #: 0193-1
NASA DATA=:+
'BASELINE [ ]







PNEUMATIC HE PRESS VALVE ACTUATION LINE
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
+_ _FLIGHT ........ +_+=_IITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[p] [p] [P] IX]*
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ...._ _
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
THIS ASSESSMENT IS FOR SEVERAL HELIUM LINES THAT CONNECT _E _q--LL
& DRAIN VALVES TO THEIR CLOSING SOLENOIDS. THESE ARE: LV33 TO
PVll, LV35 TO PV12, LV29 TO PV9 AND LV31 TO PVI0. THESE LINES ARE
PRESSURIZED DURING ASCENT.+ .............................. +......
POSSIBLE AFT COMPARTMENT OVERPRESSURIZATION.
































(.25" ,. 38" DIA)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MPS
4640
PNEUMATIC HE PRESS VALVE ACTUATION LINE
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ HA]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
IX]*
IX]
[ ]COMPARE [ N /N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] .... [ NA] [_ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS ASSESSMENT IS FOR THREE HELIUM LINES THAT CONNE_A SOLEONID
VALE TO A PROPELLANT VALVE IN ORDER TO OPERATE THE PROPELLANT
VALVE. THESE ARE: LV36 TO PV14, 15, 16, LV77 TO PV20AND LV78
TO PV21.
THESE LINES ARE UNPRESSURIZED DURING ASCENT AND REMAIN SO FOR THE
REMAINDER OF THE MISSION.
RUPTURE DURING PRELAUNCHOPERATIONS CANCAUSE LOSS OF VEHiC_
FROM SHRAPNEL IMPACT-ON-OTHER d_MP0_NTS. °..................................
REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 12-10-
87.
r
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 C-I139
L
APPENDIX C











ITEM: ...........PNEUMATICHE PRESS VALVE ACTUATION LINE





HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
[P] [F] [P] IX]*
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS ASSESSMENT IS FOR FIVE HELIUM LINES THAT CONNECT A so-LEON_D
VALE TO A PROPELLANT VALVE IN ORDER TO OPERATE THE PROPELLANT
VALVE. THESE ARE: LV39 TO PVI3, LV32 TO PVII, LV34 TO PVI2,
LV28 TO PV9 _D LV30 TO PVI0.
THESE LINES ARE UNPRESSURIZED DURING MAIN ENGINE ASCENT BUT
PRESSURIZED DURING MPS DUMP OR INERT .............._ ....................
FAILURE CAN CAUSE A_FT_CQMP_AR_TME_ QVERP_SS_IZATION- ......


































PNEUMATIC HE PRESS VALVE ACTUATION LINE




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[ P] [F] [P] [X] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
......... INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS ASSESSMENT IS FOR THE LH2 HELIUM PRESSURIZATION FLEXIBLE
HOSE ASSEMBLY (CVI3, 14, 15 TO PR6).
THIS FAILURE IS 2/IR FOR LEAKAGE OF HYDROGEN (SECOND FAILURE -
CVI4 OR CVlS) __i_ (SECOND-FATLURE---- I%E_ PI_6).
_-- ....RI2NA_SA C_ O_--i2-_--8?-AND-RT/NASA- FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING
NOTES. _....








NASA FMEA #: 0604-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







PNEUMATIC HE PRESS VALVE ACTUATION LINE
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS ASSESSMENT IS FOR THE L02 HELIUM PRESSURIZATION FLEXIBLE
HOSE ASSEMBLY (CV10 TO CVI2 AND PR5).
THIS FAILURE IS 2/IR FOR LEAKAGE OF OXYGEN (SECOND FAILURE - CVI0
OR CVI2) OF HELIUM (SECOND FAILURE " _GULATOR PR5).




























NASA FMEA #: 0634-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








PNEUMATIC HE PRESS VALVE ACTUATION LINE
A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




THIS ASSESSMENT IS FOR THE REPRESSURIZATiON LINE FROM CVI3 TO
CV24.
REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING
NOTES.





NASA FMEA #: NA
NASA DATAz .......
_ELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MPS _--_
MDAC ID: 4650
ITEM: _ PNEUMATIC HELIUM INTERCONNECT LINE
( 63" 1 00",.50" DIA)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT .........ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
THisASSESSMENT IS FOR THE HELIUM LINES FROM THE PNEUMATICS TANK






























NASA FMEA #: 0409-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


































NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /_ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



























NASA FMEA #: 0409-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


























GN2 PURGE (ORB/GND) DISC. (ORB HALF) (PDI4)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





































HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

















NASA FMEA #: 2182-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]















NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[p] IF] [P] IX] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




9 OPEN MDM BLOCKING DIODES. FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY DETERMINED BY
LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUNDANCY.
U
I
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 C-1150
mm
i
